



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THE
THREE SECESSION MOVEMENTS
IN THE
UNITED STATES.

SAMUEL J. TILDEN,

THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY;

THE ADVISER, AIDER AND ABETTOR

OF THE
GREAT SECESSION MOVEMENT OF 1860;
AND ONE OF THE AUTHORS OF THE
INFAMOUS RESOLUTION OF 1864.

HIS CLAIMS AS A STATESMAN AND REFORMER
CONSIDERED.

BOSTON:

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SECESSION IN THE UNITED STATES.

MR. TILDEN'S PAMPHLET.

THE letter, a *fac-simile* copy of which is annexed hereto, was published on the eve of the Presidential Election of 1860, by Mr. Samuel J. Tilden, at this time candidate for the Presidency of the United States, and scattered broadcast by him, in the vain hope of defeating the election of Mr. Lincoln.

THE YEAR 1860 THE GREAT CRISIS IN OUR HISTORY.

The year 1860 was the great crisis in our history. With the election of Mr. Lincoln began the desperate military struggle for the maintenance of our national unity. It had for some time been evident that the North was about to pronounce against the creation of new Slave States. The exercise of such a right or power was met on the part of the South by threats of secession; the election of Mr. Lincoln, whose triumph foreshadowed that of the cause of freedom, to be the signal for their movement. It is unnecessary again to go over the ground so often gone over. The South seceded in a body. War followed with infinite waste of blood and treasure, and with all the pangs and heart-rendings that the death, in camp or in field, of half a million of men could cause.

THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR OF THE REBELLION.

Who were the authors of this war, with all its waste of treasure and of life; which bereft almost every family in the land of some one of its members, and which turned the whole nation into a house of mourning? Those at the North who instructed the Southern States that *secession* was a right secured to them by the Constitution, and that they were the sole judges of the occasion, as well as the mode in which it was to be accomplished. Among the most conspicuous and criminal of them stands Mr. Tilden, who now asks the people to honor him with the highest office in their gift.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES — IS IT A CONFEDERATION OR A NATION?

The question always asked, from the adoption of the Constitution in 1788 to the present time, has been, "What is the nature of the government of the United States? Is it a confederation from which each State, as an integral party, may withdraw at pleasure; or is it a government of paramount powers from which no State

can withdraw but by the consent of the whole?" Although the question had in itself nothing to do with geographical distinctions or boundaries, the South very soon came to give one answer, the North another, and each differing wholly and totally in kind. That of the South was formulated on the famous Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of 1798-99, directed against the Alien and Sedition laws, and of which Mr. Jefferson, though not a member of the Legislature of either State, was the author; and in the Report made by Mr. Madison upon the same to the Legislature of the former State. These Resolutions, among other things, declared:

THE RESOLUTIONS OF 1798-99.

"That the several States composing the United States of America are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government, but that by a compact under the style and title of the Constitution for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general government for special purposes; delegated to that government certain definite powers; reserving, each State to itself, the residuary measure of right to their own self-government; and that, whensoever the general government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthorized, void, and of no force; that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and is an integral party; that the government created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself, since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself; as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress, . . . and that a nullification by those sovereignties of all unauthorized acts done under the color of that instrument is the rightful remedy."

The Resolutions adopted by both States were similar in spirit, and, substantially, in form. Those submitted to, and finally passed by, the Legislature of Virginia were referred to a Committee, of which Mr. Madison was Chairman, who submitted an elaborate Report in their support, from which the following extract is given:—

REPORT OF MR. MADISON ON THE RESOLUTIONS OF 1798-99.

"It appears to your Committee to be a plain principle founded in common sense, illustrated by common practice, and essential to the nature of compacts, that where resort can be had to no

tribunal superior to the authority of the parties, the parties themselves must be the rightful judges, in the last resort, whether the bargain made has been pursued or violated. The Constitution of the United States was formed by the sanction of the States given by each in its SOVEREIGN capacity. The States, then, being parties to the constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of necessity that there can be no tribunal above their authority to decide on the last resort whether the compact made by them be violated; and, consequently, that, as parties to it, they must themselves decide in the last resort such questions as may be of sufficient magnitude to require their interposition."

The preceding extracts sufficiently set forth the language and spirit of those Resolutions and that Report, which have exerted such a tremendous and baleful influence over the history and fortunes of the country. They include all that can be said in support of the interpretation of the Constitution by the Southern States, and by their adoption by the Democratic Party, as a fundamental article of its creed, prepared the way to their ultimate secession from the Union.

ACTS AGAINST WHICH THESE RESOLUTIONS WERE DIRECTED — ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS.

And what were the acts against which these Resolutions were directed, and which were regarded as sufficiently grave in their character to warrant the dissolution of the Union? There were four in all, the first three being termed the "Alien Acts," and the fourth, the "Sedition Act;" all passed in the summer of 1798. The first act provided for a residence in the country of fourteen years, as a condition of naturalization. The second, of which the continuance was limited to two years, gave the President authority to order out of the country all such aliens as he might judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or to be concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations. The third provided, that, in case of a declaration of war, or an invasion of the United States, all resident aliens, natives or citizens of the hostile nation, might, upon a proclamation to that effect, to be issued at the President's discretion, be apprehended, secured, or removed. The fourth, the Sedition Act, made it a high misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not exceeding \$5,000, imprisonment from six months to five years, and binding to good behavior, at the discretion of the court, for any persons unlawfully to combine and conspire together, with intent to oppose any measures of the Government of the United States; or to intimidate or to prevent any person holding office under the Government of the United States, from executing his trust; or, with like intent, to

commit, advise, or attempt to procure, any insurrection, riot, unlawful assembly or combination: and to punish by a fine not exceeding \$2,000, and imprisonment, not exceeding two years, the printing or publishing of any false, scandalous, and malicious writings against the government of the United States, or either House of Congress, or the President, with intent to defame them, or to bring them into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them the hatred of the good people of the United States; or to stir up sedition, or with intent to excite any unlawful combination for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any lawful act of the President; or to excite generally to oppose or resist any such law or act, or to aid, abet, or encourage any hostile design of any foreign nation against the United States. In all prosecutions, however, under the last act, the truth of the matter stated might be given in evidence as a good defence, the jury being made judges both of law and fact.

All these acts may have been very weak and foolish expedients, but they formed no better ground for the dissolution of the Union than the erection of a new collection district in any one of the Southern States. The utter absurdity of the pretexts put forth well illustrates the feebleness of the tie which, in the opinion of those who urged them, held the States together. The reason for the passage of the obnoxious measures was the great number of French and Irish emissaries then in the country, seeking to embroil it in a war with Great Britain. It would probably have been much better to have borne with their interference and impertinence, no matter how irritating or mischievous. They were, almost without exception, reckless adventurers, at war with all peace, order, and property in any community in which they might happen to be placed, and who would have soon become comparatively powerless, by the disgust created for them in the minds of all well-meaning citizens.

WASHINGTON'S OPINION OF THE CHARACTER OF THESE RESOLUTIONS. — LETTER TO PATRICK HENRY.

The publication of Mr. Jefferson's Resolutions, with the Report of Mr. Madison, created profound impression and alarm, and on the part of no one more than Washington. He regarded them as deliberate attempts to destroy the Union which he had labored so earnestly and untiringly to form and maintain, and whose preservation was always uppermost in his mind. Although he was in the last year of his life, and had sought to retire wholly from the turmoil of political life,

he at once returned to it, and directed all his efforts to arouse the country to a sense of its dangers, and to urge men of character, experience and influence, to come forward to its rescue. Immediately upon their publication, he addressed a letter to the celebrated Patrick Henry, which, in earnestness of expression, zeal for the public welfare, appreciation of the dangers which threatened, and for the practical wisdom displayed, was never exceeded by any thing that came from his pen. As it is a document of the greatest value, not only as illustrating the history of the time, but of the whole career of "nullification," and should be in the hands, and uppermost in the minds, of every voter, it is here given in full.¹

"MOUNT VERNON, 15th of Jan'y, 1799.

"MY DEAR SIR,—At the threshold of this letter, I ought to make an apology for its contents; but if you will give me credit for my motives, I will contend for no more, however erroneous my sentiments may appear to you.

"It would be a waste of time to attempt to bring to the view of a person of your observation and discernment the endeavors of a certain party² among us to disquiet the public mind with unfounded alarms; to arraign every act of the administration; to set the people at variance with their government, and to embarrass all its measures. Equally useless would it be to predict what must be the inevitable consequences of such a policy, if it cannot be arrested.

"Unfortunately, and extremely do I regret it, the State of Virginia has taken the lead in this position. I have said the State, because the conduct of its Legislature in the eyes of the world will authorize the expression; and because it is an incontrovertible fact, that the principal leaders of the opposition dwell in it, and that, with the help of the chiefs in other States, all the plans are arranged and systematically pursued by their followers in other parts of the Union; though in no State except Kentucky, that I have heard of, has legislative countenance been obtained beyond Virginia.³

"It has been said that the great mass of the

¹ See Sparks' Life and Writings of Washington, Vol. XI. p. 387.

² Mr. Jefferson.

³ The States of Delaware, Rhode Island, Massachusetts (then including Maine), New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont immediately and earnestly protested, in resolutions addressed to Virginia, against the doctrines put forth by that State. The Resolution adopted by the State of Delaware may be given, as briefly expressing the sentiment of all:—

"Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Delaware, in General Assembly met, that they consider the Resolutions from the State of Virginia as a very unjustifiable interference with the general government and constituted authorities of the United States, and of dangerous tendency, and therefore not a fit subject for the further consideration of this Assembly."

citizens of this State are well affected, notwithstanding, to the general government and to the Union; and I am willing to believe it, nay, do believe it; but how is this to be reconciled with their suffrages, at the election of Representatives, both to Congress and their State Legislatures, who are men opposed to the former, and by the tendency of their measures would *destroy the latter*? Some among us have endeavored to account for this inconsistency, and though convinced themselves of its truth, they are unable to convince others who are unacquainted with the internal policy of the State.

"One of the reasons assigned is, that the most respectable and best qualified among us will not come forward. Easy and happy in their circumstances at home, and believing themselves secure in their liberties and property, they will not forsake their occupations and engage in the turmoil of public business, or expose themselves to the calumnies of their opponents *whose weapons are detraction*.

"But at such a crisis as this *when every thing dear and valuable to us is assailed*, when this party hangs upon the wheels of government as a dead weight, opposing every measure that is calculated for defence and self-preservation, abetting the nefarious views of another nation upon our rights; preferring, as long as they dare contend openly against the spirit and resentment of the people, the interests of France to the welfare of their own country, justifying the former at the expense of the latter; when every act of their own government is tortured by constructions they will not bear, into attempts to infringe and trample upon the Constitution with a view to introduce monarchy; when the most unceasing and the purest exertions which were making to maintain a neutrality proclaimed by the executive, approved unequivocally by Congress, by the State Legislatures, nay, by the people themselves in various meetings, and to preserve the country in peace, are charged with being measures calculated to favor Great Britain at the expense of France, and all those who had any agency in it are accused of being under the influence of the former, and her pensioners; *when measures are systematically and pertinaciously pursued which must eventually DISSOLVE THE UNION OR PRODUCE COERCION*; I say, when these things have become so obvious, ought characters who are best able to rescue the country from the pending evil to remain at home? Rather, ought they not to come forward, and by their talents and influence, stand in the breach which such conduct has made on the peace and happiness of this country, and oppose the widening of it?

"Vain will it be to look for peace and happiness, or for the security of liberty or property, if civil discord should ensue. And *what else can result from the policy of those among us who, by all the measures in their power, are driving matters to extremity, if they cannot be counteracted effectually*? The views of men can only be known, or guessed at, by their words or actions. Can those of the leaders of this opposition be mistaken, then, if judged by this rule? That they are followed by numbers who are unac-

quainted with their designs, and suspect as little the tendency of their principles, I am fully persuaded. *But if their conduct is viewed with indifference; if there are activity and misrepresentation on one side, and supineness on the other, their numbers accumulated by intriguing and discontented foreigners under proscription, who are at war with their own governments, and the greater part of them with all governments, they will increase, and nothing short of Omnipotence can foretell the consequences.*

"I come, now, my good sir, to the object of my letter, which is to express a hope and an earnest wish that you should come forward at the ensuing elections, (if not for Congress, which you may think would take you too long from home), as a candidate for Representative in the General Assembly of this Commonwealth.

"There are, I have no doubt, very many sensible men who oppose themselves to the torrent that carries away others who had rather swim with than stem it without an able pilot to conduct them; but these are neither old in legislation nor well known in the community. Your weight of character and influence in the House of Representatives would be a bulwark against such dangerous sentiments as are delivered there at present. It would be a rallying-point for the timid, and an attraction to the wavering. In a word, I conceive it to be of the utmost importance at this crisis that you should be there; and I would fain hope that all minor considerations will be made to yield to the measure.

"If I have erroneously supposed that your sentiments on these subjects are in unison with mine; or if I have assumed a liberty which the occasion does not warrant, I must conclude as I began, with praying that my motives may be received as an apology. *My fear that the tranquillity of the Union, and of this State in particular, is hastening to an awful crisis, has extorted them from me.*

(Signed) GEO. WASHINGTON."

QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE FIRST SECESSION MOVEMENT.

The Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, and the Report referred to, on one side, and the letter of General Washington, on the other, presented the first issue that was formally made after the adoption of the Constitution, as to the nature of the government of the United States; the former denying that it constituted a nation, and declaring that States might, at will, nullify any Act of Congress, and secede: the latter taking ground precisely the opposite, — that we were a nation, and that all refractory subjects, States as well as individuals, could be coerced into obedience to it. The issue joined was perfectly simple and intelligible, and went to the very root of the matter. It transcended all reasoning or argument. If we were not a nation, only a confederation, then no obedience to it could be enforced. If we were a nation, then disobedience to it became a crime which might be punished by taking the property or life of the offender.

THE FIRST MOVEMENT ALLAYED. — ELECTION OF MR. JEFFERSON TO THE PRESIDENCY.

The movement in 1798-99 for a dissolution of the Union, which created such wide-spread alarm, ended with the expiration, or repeal, of the obnoxious acts, and by the election of Mr. Jefferson to the Presidency in 1800, which, to use his own words, "was as real a revolution in the principles of our Government as that of 1776 was in its form."

REVIVAL OF THE SECESSION MOVEMENT BY SOUTH CAROLINA, UNDER PRETEXT OF THE TARIFF LAWS.

Secession slumbered till 1832, when South Carolina made her first famous attempt to dissolve the Union, the alleged cause being the *Tariff*. In November of that year, she issued an Ordinance which, after reciting the grievances that led to its adoption, declared, among other things, —

ORDINANCE OF NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION BY THAT STATE.

"That the several Acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, and now having actual operation and effect within the United States; and more especially 'an Act in alteration of the several Acts imposing duties on imports approved 19th May, 1828;' also, an Act to amend the several acts imposing duties on imposts, passed 14th July, 1832,' — are UNAUTHORIZED by the Constitution of the United States, and violate the true intent and meaning thereof; and are null, void, and no law binding upon this State, its officers or citizens; and all promises, contracts, and obligations made or entered into, or to be made or entered into, with the purpose to secure the duties imposed by said Acts; and all judicial proceedings which shall hereafter be had in affirmance thereof, — are and shall be held utterly null and void.

"And we, the people of South Carolina, to the end that it may be fully understood by the Government of the United States, and the people of the co States, that we are determined to maintain this our ordinance and declaration, at every hazard, do further declare that we will not submit to the application of *force* on the part of the Federal Government to reduce this State to obedience; but will consider the passage by Congress of any Act authorizing the employment of a military or naval force against the State of South Carolina, her constitutional authorities or citizens; or any Act abolishing or closing the ports of the States, or any of them, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress or egress of vessels to and from the said ports; or any other Act on the part of the Federal Government to COERCE the State, shut up her ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to enforce the Acts hereby declared, to be null and void, otherwise than through the

civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union; and that the people of this State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the people of the other States, and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent States may of right do."

Such was a part of the famous Ordinance of Nullification of South Carolina in 1832. It was instantly met by a proclamation against it by General Jackson, as President of the United States, in which, among other things, he said:—

COUNTER PROCLAMATION BY GENERAL JACKSON.

"This right to secede is deduced from the nature of the Constitution, which, they say, is a compact between *sovereign* States, who have preserved their whole *sovereignty*, and, therefore, are subject to no superior; that, because they made the compact, they can break it when, in their opinion, it has been departed from by the other States. Fallacious as this course of reasoning is, it enlists State pride, and finds advocates in the honest prejudices of those who have not studied the nature of our Government sufficiently to see the radical error on which it rests."

"The people of the United States formed the Constitution, acting through the State Legislatures in making the compact, to meet and discuss its provisions, and acting in separate Conventions when they ratified those provisions; but the terms used in its construction show it to be a government in which the people of all the States *collectively* are represented. We are one people in the choice of the President and Vice-President. Here the States have no other agency than to direct the mode in which the votes shall be given. Candidates having the majority of all the votes are chosen. The electors of a majority of States may have given their votes for one candidate, and yet another may be chosen. The *people*, then, and not the States, are represented in the executive branch."

"The Constitution of the United States, then, forms a government, *not a league*; and whether it be formed by compact between the States, or in any other manner, its character is the same. It is a government in which all the people are represented, which operates directly on the people individually, not upon the States,—they retained all the power they did not grant. But that each State, having expressly parted with so many powers as to constitute, jointly with the other States, a single nation cannot, from that period, possess any right to secede, because such secession does not break a league, but destroys the unity of a nation; and any injury to that unity is not only a breach which would result from the contravention of a compact, but it is an offence against the *whole Union*. To say that any State may at pleasure secede from the Union, is to say that the United States are not a nation, because it would be a solecism to contend that any part of a nation might dissolve its con-

nection with the other parts, to their injury or ruin, without committing any offence. Secession, like any other revolutionary act, may be morally justified by the extremity of oppression; but to call it a constitutional right is confounding the meaning of terms; and can be only done through gross error, or to deceive those who are willing to assert a right, but would pause before they made a revolution, or incur the penalties consequent on a failure.

"The dictates of a high duty oblige me solemnly to announce that you cannot succeed. *The laws of the United States must be executed. I have no discretionary powers upon the subject; my duty is emphatically pronounced in the Constitution.* Those who told you that you might peaceably prevent their execution deceived you; they could not have deceived themselves. **THEIR OBJECT IS DISUNION.** Be not deceived by names. *Disunion by armed force is TREASON!* Are you ready to incur its guilt? If you are, on the heads of the instigators of the act be the dreadful consequences—on their heads be the dishonor, but on yours may fall the punishment. The chief magistrate of the nation cannot, if he would, avoid the performance of his duty.

"Look back to what was first told you as an inducement to enter into this dangerous course. The great political truth was repeated to you, that you had the revolutionary right of resisting all laws that were palpably unconstitutional and intolerably oppressive; it was added that the right to nullify a law rested on the same principle, but that it was a peaceable remedy! This character which was given to it made you receive with too much confidence the assertions that were made of the unconstitutionality of the law and its oppressive effects. Mark, my fellow-citizens, that, by the admission of your leaders, the unconstitutionality must be palpable, or it will not justify either resistance or nullification! What is the meaning of the word "palpable," in the sense in which it is here used? That which is apparent to every one; that which no man of ordinary intellect will fail to perceive. Is the unconstitutionality of these laws of that description? Let those among your leaders who once approved and advocated the principle of protective duties, answer the question; and let them choose whether they will be considered as incapable, then, of perceiving that which must have been apparent to every man of common understanding, or as imposing upon your confidence, and endeavoring to mislead you now. In either case, they are unsafe guides in the perilous path they urge you to tread. Ponder well on this circumstance, and you will know how to appreciate the exaggerated language they address to you. They are not champions of liberty, emulating the fame of our revolutionary fathers; nor are you an oppressed people, contending, as they repeat to you, against worse than colonial vassalage."

"I adjure you, as you honor their memory; as you love the cause of freedom, to which they dedicated their lives; as you prize the peace of your country, the lives of its best citizens, and your own fair fame,—to retrace your steps. Snatch

from the archives of your State the disorganizing edict of its Convention; bid its members to reassemble, and promulgate the decided expressions of your will to remain in the path which alone can conduct you to safety, prosperity, and honor. Tell them, that, compared to disunion, all other evils are light, because that brings with it an accumulation of all. *Declare that you will never take the field unless the star-spangled banner of your country shall float over you; that you will not be stigmatized when dead, and dishonored and scorned while you live, as the authors of the first attack on the Constitution of your country. Its destroyers you cannot be. You may disturb its peace; you may interrupt the course of its prosperity; you may cloud its reputation for stability; but its tranquillity will be restored, its prosperity will return, and the stain upon its national character will be transferred, and remain an eternal blot on the memory of those who caused the disaster.*

"Fellow-citizens of the United States, the threat of unhallowed disunion, the names of those, once respected, by whom it is uttered, the array of military force to support it, denote the approach of a crisis in our affairs, on which the continuance of our unexampled prosperity, our political existence, and, perhaps, that of all free governments, may depend. The conjuncture demanded a full, free, and explicit enunciation, not only of my intentions, but of my principles of action; and, as the claim was asserted of a right by a State to annul the laws of the Union, and even to secede from it at pleasure, a frank exposition of my opinions in relation to the origin and form of our government, and the construction I give to the instrument by which it was created, seem to be proper. Having the fullest confidence in the justness of the legal and constitutional opinion of my duties which has been expressed, I rely, with equal confidence, on your undivided support in my determination to execute the laws; to preserve the Union by all constitutional means; to assert, if possible, by moderate but firm measures, the necessity of a recourse to force; and if it be the will of Heaven that the recurrence of its primeval curse on man for the shedding of a brother's blood should fall upon our land, that it be not called down by any offensive act on the part of the United States."

THESE ATTEMPTS AT SECESSION, IDENTICAL IN SPIRIT AND DOCTRINES.

It will be seen that this *second* attempt at secession took precisely the same ground, and repeated, on both sides, the language of the first. On one side it was claimed that the States did not constitute a nation; were independent sovereignties, and could not be coerced; on the other, that the people of the States did constitute a nation; that so far the sovereignty of the States was lost or merged in it, and that it could not be attacked or dissolved by any party or parties to it; and that such an attack was treason, and carried with it all the penalties attached to that great crime.

SOUTH CAROLINA PERSISTS. — THE FORCE BILL PASSED, AND SECESSION ABANDONED.

The State reiterating its intention to dissolve the Union, in the event of the enforcement of the obnoxious laws, Congress speedily passed what was termed the Force Bill, and General Jackson, with that promptitude which characterized all his actions, particularly in military affairs, filled the forts and military posts of the State with troops and munitions, anchored a naval force off Charleston, and stood ready on the first act of resistance to the laws to "cry havoc, and let slip the dogs of war." It was well known that he made no secret of his intention to arrest Mr. Calhoun and all others implicated on the charge of HIGH TREASON the moment any overt act was committed. He swore, as was his wont, "by the Eternal," that he would hang the first man who raised his impious hand against the Union; "would shoot the first man who pulled down the American flag." He made no secret in after years of declaring that he ought to have hung Mr. Calhoun.¹ He was right. The seasonable example made of one man might have saved half a million of lives. The immunity accorded to Calhoun discharged every one who chose, from all sense of duty to his country and to his fellows, from all respect for law, and is the cause of no small part of the evils under which the nation is now laboring, and the demoralization witnessed on every side.

While no man was more loyal, no man ever penetrated the designs of the secessionists more clearly and thoroughly than General Jackson. Although he put down the rebellion with a high hand, he plainly saw that he had only "scotched" the snake of secession, not killed it. He knew that the Tariff was a mere pretext, and that slavery would be the next one as soon as the way could be prepared.² He even lived

¹ "The old Jackson men of the inner set still speak of Mr. Calhoun in terms that show that they consider him at once the most wicked and the most despicable of American statesmen. He was a coward, conspirator, hypocrite, traitor, and fool, say they. He strove, schemed, dreamed, and lived only for the Presidency; and when he despaired of reaching that office by honorable means, he sought to rise upon the ruins of his country, — thinking it better to reign in South Carolina than to serve in the United States. General Jackson lived and died in this opinion. In his last sickness he declared that, on reflecting upon his administration, he chiefly regretted that he had not had John C. Calhoun executed for treason. 'My country,' said the General, 'would have sustained me in the act, and his fate would have been a warning to traitors for all time to come.' " — Parton's Life of Jackson, vol. iii. p. 447.

² "MY DEAR SIR, — . . . I have had a laborious task here; but nullification is dead, and its actors and courtiers will only be remembered by the people to be

to witness the beginning, under the administration of Mr. Polk, of the movement which was to end in an attempt to break up the Union by force, and to find himself deserted and deceived by the very man in whom he had so confided, and who, upon his election to the presidency, turned his back upon his old patron, and allied himself to that section of the party whose disunion scheme Jackson had so earnestly and persistently combatted. Under Pierce the triumph of the secessionists became complete, and their exactions, particularly in reference to the extension of slavery, so intolerable, that all the Northern Democracy that had any idea of justice, manliness, or shame left in them, broke from the party, and joining the best part of the old National Whigs, formed a new party, the Republican, which hurled the traitors from power, and saved the Nation.

CAUSE AND PROGRESS OF THE THIRD MOVEMENT TOWARDS SECESSION.

The occasions which led to the threatened secession of 1798-99 and to that of 1832 were accidental in their character. The laws complained of might be injurious or beneficial, depending upon the ideas or fancy of those affected by them. Their expiration or repeal might remove all cause of complaint. Not so with the question of slavery, which was the cause that first carried the doctrine of secession to its overt act. This was really the imminent one from the very foundation of the Gov-

execrated for their wicked designs to rise and destroy the only good government on the globe, and that prosperity and happiness which we enjoy over every other portion of the world. Haman's gallows ought to be the fate of all such ambitious men who would involve their country in civil war and all the evils in its train, that they might reign and ride in the whirlwind, and direct the storm. The free people of these United States have spoken, and consigned these wicked demagogues to their proper doom. Take care of your nullifiers: you have them among you. Let them meet the indignant frowns of every man who loves his country. The Tariff, it is *now* known, was a mere pretext: its burden was on your coarse woollens. By the law of July, 1832, coarse woollen was reduced to five per cent for the benefit of the South. Mr. Clay's bill takes it up and classes it with woollens at fifty per cent, reduces it gradually down to twenty-five per cent, and there it remains; and Mr. Calhoun and all the nullifiers agree to the principle. The cash duties and home valuation will be equal to fifteen per cent more; and, after the year 1842, you pay on coarse woollens thirty-five per cent. If this is not protection, I cannot understand; and, therefore, the Tariff was only the pretext, and disunion and a Southern Confederacy the real object. *The next pretext will be the negro or slavery question.*

(Signed)

ANDREW JACKSON.

[See letter to A. J. Howard, dated May 1, 1833, McPherson's Hist. Rebellion, p. 389.]

ernment. It was the greatest obstacle to the formation of the Constitution. At that time, through its influence, two nations were upon our soil, separated by a sharp and well-defined line. The two were very nearly equal in numbers, and not very unequal in territory and natural resources. Totally dissimilar in ideas and institutions, they naturally viewed each other with jealousy; or rather the South the North, as the latter had nothing to fear from the former, while the former had a great deal to fear from the latter. Institutions and society at the South rested on force, — not on right. Should these become dislocated from any cause, no matter how accidental, they might never be restored. Those of the North, resting on natural laws, could never be imperilled by mere outward pressure. The North therefore freely committed itself to the influence and guidance of ideas, no matter the direction in which they might lead, confident they could only lead to good; and eagerly welcomed, and made the most of every suggestion, improvement, and invention, which promised to increase its wealth, its comforts, and its power. It allied itself with natural laws, — with steam and electricity, — and by such alliance acquired more than human strength. The South blindfolded labor, cut itself off from the spirit of progress, and deprived itself of the use of all those contrivances and inventions which, within the memory of man, have changed the whole face of society; and as a necessary consequence it soon fell far behind the North, so far as numbers were concerned, in the race for supremacy. It viewed with constantly increasing dread that mighty power which loomed up so majestically in the distance, and which might, some day, be directed against that institution upon which rested all its material interests. Conscious of its impotence to compete in numbers and wealth, its whole energy and skill were directed to compensate for their want by political finesse, and by the control of the government, so as to use it as the instrument for its own protection. It allied itself with the great Democratic party, which was dominant in most of the Northern States, and which, almost certain of remaining in power through the aid of its Southern allies, was content, for the privilege of the spoils, to concede any interpretation which the South might put upon the Constitution, and the direction and control of the party machinery.

THE TWO-THIRDS VOTE.

With such concessions, the Southern people proceeded slowly but surely in their plans of

committing the Democratic party, and through it the country, to the Resolutions of 1798-99. In the Convention of 1835, which nominated Mr. Van Buren for the Presidency, it secured an immense advantage by the adoption of a rule which required a two-thirds vote for the nomination of a candidate for the Presidency. By this rule, the whole form and spirit of our political institutions were changed. An oligarchy was substituted for the rule of the majority. This rule which has since prevailed in every national Democratic Convention, which has become a cardinal principle with the party, and which always enables a few adroit and unscrupulous managers to control the Conventions, gave to the Southern States the power to prevent the nomination of any person who was not fully committed to their interests, and in whom they could not implicitly confide.

THE SECESSION RESOLUTION OF 1840.

In the Convention which renominated Mr. Van Buren in 1840 another important step was gained by the adoption of a resolution which declared :—

“That the Federal Government is one of *limited* powers, derived solely from the Constitution, and the grants of power shown therein ought to be strictly construed by all the departments and agents of the Government; and that it is inexpedient and dangerous to exercise doubtful constitutional powers.”

COMPLETE TRIUMPH OF THE SOUTH IN 1852.

This resolution was repeated at the Conventions of 1844 and 1848. At the Convention of 1852, the South accomplished its grand purpose by committing the whole Democratic Party to the doctrines, in all their length and breadth, of the right of secession by the adoption of a resolution which declared, —

“That the Democratic Party will faithfully abide by and uphold the principles laid down in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, and in the Report of Mr. Madison to the Virginia Legislature in 1793; that it adopts those principles as constituting one of the main foundations of its political creed; and is resolved to carry them out in their obvious meaning and import.”

By the adoption of the two-thirds rule, and the resolution last recited, the South secured to itself a position in which it could with safety remain in the Union, so long as the Democratic Party could elect a President, always to be designated by itself; or could leave it so soon as it could no longer control its policy and action.

The election of Mr. Pierce by an almost unanimous vote in the Electoral College, only four States voting against him, and by an overwhelming majority of the popular vote, was of itself

received as full evidence of the entire acceptance by the North of the doctrine of the right of peaceable secession. It was reiterated and indorsed in all the States and in all the local ratifying Conventions; in all those held for the nomination of State officers and Members of Congress; so that there was hardly a Democrat in the whole United States who did not, in the course of the canvass, give repeated and emphatic “AYES” to the secession doctrine. Well might Mr. Calhoun, had he lived till then, have exclaimed, “Now let thy servant depart in peace!” for the defeat of the National Whig Party, in 1852, was a virtual annihilation of all effective opposition to the complete ascendancy of the Democratic Party, which ruled supreme till the organization of a new party, — the Republican, — upon the basis of Freedom, and its final triumph by the election of Mr. Lincoln, in 1860.

MR. TILDEN COMES TO THE FRONT, AND PROCLAIMS THE RIGHT OF SECESSION. — HIS LETTER TO HON. WILLIAM KENT.

As the secession resolution of 1852 was repeated in 1856, and by both wings of the Democratic Party in 1860, — that which nominated Mr. Douglas at Baltimore, and that which nominated Mr. Breckenridge at Richmond, — the South, as far as the Democratic Party was concerned, was left, upon the election of Mr. Lincoln, free to choose whether it would remain in the Union, or peaceably secede from it. It was at this crisis that Mr. Tilden first became conspicuous in political affairs. His zeal and activity knew no bounds. His eloquence flamed, in the canvass, from every rostrum and stump. He asserted that the South had as much at stake in slavery as the North had in freedom; that it had as much right to pollute the Territories with its institutions as the North had to adorn it with its own; and that, unless the South was gratified in all its demands, it might and ought to retire from the Union; that there was no tie to hold it, no power to coerce it. His views were fully and carefully elaborated in the letter to the Hon. William Kent, already referred to. In that letter he says :—

“Each section is organized into States with complete governments, *holding the power and wielding the sword*. They are held together *only* by a compact of confederation. . . . The single, slender, conventional tie which holds the States in confederation has no strength compared with the compacted intertwining fibres which bind the atoms of human society into one formation of natural growth. . . . The masters in political science who constructed our system preserved the State Governments as bulwarks of the freedom of individuals and localities against oppression from centralized power. They recog-

n'zed no right of constitutional secession; BUT THEY LEFT REVOLUTION ORGANIZED WHENEVER IT SHOULD BE DEMANDED BY THE PUBLIC OPINION OF A STATE, — LEFT IT, WITH THE POWER TO SNAP THE TIE OF CONFEDERATION AS A NATION MIGHT BREAK A TREATY, AND TO REPEL COERCION AS A NATION MIGHT REPEL INVASION. They caused us to depend in great measure upon the public opinion of the States, in order to maintain a confederated union."

Again (page 7) : —

"As a rule of right and duty, for the construction and execution of the Constitution, the theory maintained by Mr. Seward, and too exclusively accepted (that the Government could exclude slavery from the Territories), is entirely fallacious. No contract governing complicated transactions or relations between men, and applying permanently through the changes inevitable in human affairs, can be effectual if either party intended to be bound by it is at liberty to construe or execute its provisions in a spirit of hostility to the substantial objects of those provisions, — especially is this true of a compact of confederation between the States, where there can be no common arbiter invested with authorities and powers equally capable with those which courts possess between individuals for determining and enforcing a just construction and execution of the instrument."

It will be observed that the latter part of the quotation reiterates almost in terms the language used by Mr. Madison in his report as to the want of a common arbiter between the States; and that each State, consequently, must be the sole judge of the emergency in which it may be called upon to act. The first part is even more emphatic than the secession Resolutions themselves in declaring, that, upon its mere motion, "A STATE MAY SNAP THE TIE OF CONFEDERATION AS A NATION MIGHT BREAK A TREATY, AND REPEL COERCION AS A NATION MIGHT REPEL INVASION."

THE SOUTH SECEDES, SOUTH CAROLINA LEADING AS IN 1832.

These words of encouragement and instruction for the Southern States had hardly fallen from Mr. Tilden's lips, than they proceeded to put them in practice. At that time Jackson no longer stood with flaming sword to bar the way. On the sixth day of November, 1860, before the election of Mr. Lincoln, the Legislature of the State of South Carolina assembled, and received a message from the Governor, in which he expressed his opinion that the only alternative left to it was secession from the Federal Union. On the 7th of November, the Postmaster, Collector, and other Federal officers in Charleston resigned their respective positions. On the 10th of November, the Senators from that State, in Congress, resigned. On the 13th of November, the collec-

tion of debts due to citizens of non-slaveholding States was prohibited. On the same day, Francis W. Pickens was elected Governor, and appointed, as a Cabinet, A. G. McGrath, Secretary of State; David F. Jamison, Secretary of War; C. G. Memminger, Secretary of the Treasury; William W. Harllee, Postmaster General; and Albert C. Garlington, Secretary of the Interior. On the 17th of the same month, the ordinance of secession was unanimously adopted by a convention of delegates called for that purpose. On the 21st of November, commissioners were appointed to proceed to Washington to treat for the delivery to the State of the property of the United States within its limits. On the 24th of November, the Representatives of the State in Congress resigned their seats. And, on the 20th of December, 1860, the Governor of the State announced the repeal, by the people of South Carolina, of the ordinance (of the adoption of the Constitution) of May 23, 1788, and the dissolution of the Union between the State of South Carolina and other States, under the name of the United States of America; and proclaimed to the world that "the State of South Carolina is, as she has a right to be, a separate, sovereign, free, and independent State; and, as such, has the right to levy war, to conclude peace, to negotiate treaties, leagues, or covenants, and to do all acts whatsoever rightfully appertaining to a free and independent State."

The history of one seceding State will do for all. All the Southern States, as speedily as possible, followed the example of South Carolina, adopting her language and acts as precedents for theirs; so that, before Mr. Lincoln came to the Presidential Chair, nearly all of the Southern States had asserted, and apparently effected, the right of secession which Mr. Tilden proclaimed for them on every stump, and which he did all that lay in his power to forward.

THE SOUTH RIGHT IN SECEDING, ACCORDING TO MR. TILDEN AND THE NORTHERN DEMOCRACY.

In looking back to this time, was not the conduct of the Southern States, from all the lights they could gather, perfectly justifiable and proper? A great party, existing from the foundation of the Government and embracing a large majority of the population of the Free States, had in almost every possible form declared their rights to be what by the act of secession they assumed them to be. It was not to be expected that they should recognize any duty of allegiance to the Republican Party, in case the latter came into power. It would be, in their view, the

devotion to destruction of their dearest interests. The Republican Party proclaimed the incompatibility of Slavery with a free government; that the nation must, in time, become "all free or all slave." The South appreciated this great truth as well as the North. Such assumption rested not upon opinion, but upon natural law. They were content to remain in the Union so long as it could be made to protect slavery, and not a moment longer. They could judge of the sentiment of the North—of the Democratic party—only through its leaders,—through its exponents, among whom Mr. Tilden took a foremost rank. These leaders were unanimous as to the right of the Southern States to secede; and the multitude spoke only through them.

FRANKLIN PIERCE ASSERTS THE RIGHT OF THE SOUTH TO SECEDE.

Mr. Pierce, President of the United States from 1852 to 1856, wrote to his old friend, Jefferson Davis, his former Secretary of War, and the future President of the slave republic, under the date of Jan. 6, 1860, nearly a year before the election of Mr. Lincoln, in the following strain:—

"I have just had a pleasant interview with Mr. —, whose courage and fidelity are equal to his learning and talents. He says he would rather fight the battle under you as a standard-bearer in 1860, than under the auspices of any other leader. The feeling and judgment of Mr. — is, I am confident, rapidly gaining ground. Our people are looking for the 'COMING MAN,' one who is raised by all the elements of his character above the atmosphere ordinarily breathed by politicians; a man really formed for this exigency, by his ability, courage, broad statesmanship, and patriotism. Colonel Thomas H. Seymour arrived here this morning, and expressed his views in this relation in almost the identical language used by Mr. —. . . . I do not believe that our friends at the South have any just idea of the state of feeling, hurrying at this moment to the pitch of intense exasperation, between those who respect their political obligations and those who have apparently no impelling power but that which the fanatical passion on the subject of slavery imparts. Without discussing the question of right, of abstract power to secede, I have never believed that actual disruption of the Union can occur without blood; AND IF THROUGH THE MADNESS OF NORTHERN ABOLITIONISM, THAT DIRE CALAMITY MUST COME, THE FIGHTING WILL NOT BE ALONG MASON AND DIXON'S LINE MERELY. IT WILL BE WITHIN OUR OWN FOLDERS, IN OUR OWN STREETS, BETWEEN THE TWO CLASSES OF CITIZENS TO WHOM I HAVE REFERRED. THOSE WHO DEFY LAW, AND SCOUT CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS, WILL, IF WE

EVER REACH THE ARBITRAMENT OF ARMS, FIND OCCUPATION ENOUGH AT HOME." . . .

(Signed) "FRANKLIN PIERCE."

"To Hon JEFFERSON DAVIS, Washington, D. C."

BUCHANAN ON THE RIGHT OF THE SOUTH TO SECEDE.

Mr. Buchanan, in his last message to the Congress of the United States, delivered on the 4th of December, 1860, and after the secession of South Carolina, took precisely the ground of Mr. Tilden, that the Federal Government could not coerce a seceding State. —

"The question fairly stated," said Mr. Buchanan, in the message referred to, "is: Has the Constitution delegated to Congress the power to *coerce* a State into submission which is attempting to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn, from the Confederacy? If answered in the affirmative, it must be on the principle that the power has been conferred on Congress to declare and to make war against a State. After much serious reflection, I HAVE ARRIVED AT THE CONCLUSION THAT NO SUCH POWER HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO CONGRESS NOR TO ANY OTHER DEPARTMENT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. It is manifest, upon an inspection of the Constitution, that this power is not among the specific and enumerated powers granted to Congress; and it is equally apparent that its exercise is not necessary and proper for carrying into execution any one of its powers. . . .

"But, if we possessed this power, would it be wise to exercise it under existing circumstances? The object, doubtless, would be to preserve the Union. *War would not only present the most effectual means of destroying it, but would finish all hopes of its peaceful reconstruction.*

"The fact is, that our Union rests upon PUBLIC OPINION,¹ and can never be cemented

¹ With Mr. Tilden, Mr. Buchanan, and the like, *influence* is government. Let us see what Washington said about influence being Government.

"The picture which you have exhibited, and the accounts which are published of the commotions and temper of numerous parties in the Eastern States, present a state of things equally to be lamented and deprecated. They exhibit a melancholy proof of what our transatlantic foe has predicted; and of another thing, perhaps, which is still more to be regretted, and is yet more unaccountable, that mankind, when left to themselves, are unfit for their own government. I am mortified beyond expression when I view the clouds that have spread over the brightest morn that ever dawned upon any country. In a word, I am lost in amazement when I behold what intrigue, the interested views of desperate characters, ignorance, and jealousy of the minor part, are capable of effecting, as a scourge on the major part of our fellow-citizens of the Union; for it is hardly to be supposed, that the great body of the people, though they will not act, can be so short-sighted, or enveloped in darkness, as not to see rays of a distant sun through all this mist of intoxication and folly.

¹ See McPherson's History of the Rebellion, page 391.

"You talk, my good sir, of employing influence to

by the blood of its citizens, shed in civil war. *If it cannot live in the affections of the people, it must one day perish.* Congress possesses many means of preserving it by conciliation; but the sword was not placed in their hands to preserve it by force.

"In this conclusion, I shall merely call attention to the few sentences in *Mr. Madison's justly celebrated Report in 1799, to the Legislature of Virginia.* In this he ably and conclusively defended the *Resolutions of the preceding Legislature (of 1798) against the strictures of several other State Legislatures.* These were mainly founded upon the protest of the *Virginia Legislature against the Alien and Sedition Laws, as palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution.* In pointing out the peaceful and constitutional remedies, and he referred to none other, to which the States were authorized to resort on such occasions, he concludes by saying that the Legislatures of the States might have made direct representation to Congress with a view to obtain a rescinding of the two offending acts; or they might have represented to their respective Senators in Congress their wish that two-thirds thereof would propose an explanatory amendment of the Constitution; or two-thirds of themselves, if such had been their option, might, by an application to Congress, have obtained a Convention for the same object."

It will be observed that Mr. Buchanan had "fully adopted the Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, and the Report of Mr. Madison¹ to the Virginia Legislature in 1799; and that he adopted the principle contained therein as constituting one of the main foundations of the appease the present turmoils in Massachusetts. I know not where that influence is to be found; or, if attainable, that it would be a proper remedy for the disorders. INFLUENCE IS NOT GOVERNMENT. Let us have a government by which our lives, liberties, and properties will be secured, or let us know the worst at once. Under these impressions, my humble opinion is, that there is a call for decision. Know precisely what the insurgents aim at. If they have *real* grievances, redress them if possible; or acknowledge the justice of them, and your inability to do it at the moment. If they have not, *employ the force of government against them at once.* If this is inadequate, *all* will be convinced that the superstructure is bad, or wants support. To be more exposed in the eyes of the world, and more contemptible than we already are, is hardly possible. To delay one or the other of these expedients, is to exasperate on the one hand, or to give confidence on the other, and will add to their numbers; for, like snowballs, such bodies increase by every movement, unless there is something in the way to obstruct and crumble them before their weight is too great and irresistible." (See Letter to Henry Lee, Wash. Works, (Sparks' ed.) vol. ix., p. 203.)

¹ It is proper to state, that, later in life, Mr. Madison fully recanted the doctrines of his Report, and the Resolutions of 1798-99. Mr. Jefferson adhered to them to the last, and even repeated them in 1824 with more emphasis than ever. Mr. Madison's recantation brought down upon him the most violent attacks and abuse from the nullification party.

political creed of the Democratic Party, and had resolved to carry them out in their obvious meaning and import." And well did he carry them out. He folded his hands in impotent despair, and allowed the rebels to seize nearly every stronghold in the South, which were only regained by a cost of almost infinite blood and treasure.

J. S. BLACK, BUCHANAN'S ATTORNEY-GENERAL,
ON THE RIGHT OF THE SOUTH TO SECEDE.

Mr. J. S. Black, Attorney-General of the United States under Buchanan, in reply to an inquiry as to the right of the government to coerce the seceding States, replied in a similar strain.

"If it be true," he said, "that war cannot be declared [as he had attempted to show in his letter that it could not], nor a system of general hostilities be carried on by the central government against a State, then it seems to follow that an attempt to do so would be *ipso facto* an expulsion of such State from the Union." Being treated as an alien and an enemy, she would be compelled to act accordingly. If Congress should break up the present Union, by unconstitutionally putting strife, and enmity, and armed hostility, between the different sections of the country, instead of '*domestic tranquillity*,' which the Constitution was meant to insure, will not all the States be absolved from their Federal obligations? Is any portion of the people bound to contribute their money or their blood to carry on a contest like this?

"If this view of the subject be as correct as I think it is, then the Union must perish, utterly perish, at the moment when Congress shall arm one portion of the people against another, for any purpose beyond that of merely protecting the General Government in the essence of its proper constitutional functions."

FERNANDO WOOD ON THE RIGHT OF THE SOUTH
TO SECEDE.

In 1861, at the outbreak of the rebellion, Mr. Fernando Wood was mayor of the City of New York. At such a crisis, no position in the United States could be more important to the cause of nationality and freedom. He not only took the ground that the Union was rightfully and irreparably dissolved, but he was already forecasting the section or party with which the City of New York should cast its fortunes. That city was not only dissolved from allegiance to the Nation, but the State. On the 6th of May, 1861, he sent a message to its common council, in which he used the following language:—

"It would seem the dissolution of the Federal Union is inevitable. Having been formed originally on the basis of general mutual protection, *but separate local independence*,—each

State reserving the entire and absolute control of its own domestic affairs, — *it is evidently impossible to keep them together longer than they deem themselves fairly treated by each other, or longer than the interests, honor, and fraternity, of the people of the several States are satisfied. Being a government created by OPINION, its continuance is dependent upon the continuance of the sentiments which formed it. It cannot be preserved by coercion, or held together by force. A resort to this last dreaded alternative would, of itself, destroy not only the government, but the lives and property of the people.*

"If these forebodings should be realized, and a separation of the States shall occur, momentous considerations will be presented to the corporate authorities of this city. We must provide for new relations, which will necessarily grow out of the new condition of public affairs.

"It will be not only necessary for us to settle the relations which we shall hold to the other cities and States, but to establish new ones, if we can, with a PORTION of our own State. . . .

"California, and her sisters of the Pacific, will no doubt set up an independent Republic, and husband their own rich mineral resources. The Western States, equally rich in cereals and other agricultural products, will probably do the same. *Then it may be said, why should not New York City, instead of supporting by her contributions in revenue two-thirds the expenses of the United States, become also equally independent?* As a free city, with but nominal duty on her imports, her local government could be supported without taxation upon her people. Thus we could live free from taxes, and have cheap goods, nearly duty free. In this she would have the whole and united support of the SOUTHERN STATES, as well as all the other States to whose interest and rights under the Constitution she has always been true."

RODMAN M. PRICE ON THE RIGHT OF THE SOUTH TO SECEDE.

In the spring of 1861, Mr. Rodman M. Price, who had recently been Governor of the State of New Jersey, in a letter addressed to Mr. L. W. Burnett, of Newark, in answer to the question, "What ought New Jersey to do?" replied:

"I believe the Southern Confederation permanent. The proceeding has taken place with forethought and deliberation; it is no hurried impulse, but an irrevocable act, based upon the sacred, as was supposed, equality of the States; and, in my opinion, every Slave State will, in a short period of time, be united in one Confederacy. Before that event happens, we cannot act, however much we may suffer in our material interests. It is in that contingency, then, that I answer the second part of your question, What position for New Jersey will best accord with her interests, honor, and the patriotic instincts of her people? I say, emphatically, she would go with the South, from every wise, prudent, and patriotic reason."¹

¹ See McPherson's Hist. of the Rebellion, p. 390.

LEADERS OF THE NORTHERN DEMOCRACY RESPONSIBLE FOR SECESSION.

The preceding examples of the position of the leaders of the Northern Democracy at that time upon the subject of secession might be repeated without limit. The Southern people were told to go — were literally driven — out of the Union by their friends. They never would have raised the standard of the rebellion had they possessed the least idea of the real sentiment of the North. How could they get at that sentiment? Not through the Republican Party, which represented only a small majority of the North, and which, if war arose, was to be confronted by the Democrats in arms on their own soil. If fifty persons of the class we have quoted from had told the Southern people that they had no right to secede, that the attempt would be met by armed force, that the days and spirit of General Jackson were still remembered and revered, and that his denunciations of secession would become the watchwords of freedom, the South would never have taken the first step in rebellion.

What an infinite number of murders, of deaths in battle and camp, are to be laid to the charge of such men as Tilden, Buchanan, Wood, and the old leaders of Democracy, but for whom secession would have been but a dream! And one of these very men whose garments are most deeply dyed in the blood of his fellows is now to be made President of the United States, — to administer a government which he has spent a lifetime in attempting to undermine and overthrow!

BUCHANAN, TILDEN, AND OTHERS CONTRASTED WITH WASHINGTON AND JACKSON.

When we contrast the conduct of Mr. Buchanan and his government, in the third attempt at secession, with that of Washington and Jackson in the two preceding attempts, we can get some idea of the depth of the abyss of degradation into which the leaders of the Northern democracy had fallen. From the proclamation of General Jackson, in 1832, to the last message of Buchanan, in 1860, was a period of only twenty-eight years. Yet the conduct of the actors at these two periods was as unlike as if there had been centuries between them. One cannot imagine such a man as Jackson to belong to the same race with such as Buchanan, Tilden, Wood, and Franklin Pierce; one so patriotic, with such consciousness of the magnitude and importance of the issue before him, not only for his own people, but for mankind; knowing no duty for the moment but the preservation of the Union; the others so traitorous, so utterly lost to all sense of patriot-

ism and humanity, that they would break up the government unless it could be made the instrument of polluting our virgin soil with slavery, and be made to minister to the ambitions and passions of those whose characters were the product of this accursed system. "Our Federal Union, it must be *preserved*," was Jackson's famous toast which, at the time, sent such a thrill through the hearts of his countrymen. Had secession become an overt act, he would have put into the field the last man, would have fired the last shot, and freely given up, if need be, his own life. What did Washington say in the letter to Henry Lee, already quoted? "If they (the malcontents in Massachusetts) have real grievances, *redress* them. If they have not, *employ the force of government against them at once!*" Contrast Washington and Jackson with such a wretched, sneaking, imbecile creature as Buchanan, who, when his trial came, sat motionless with terror, pleading as the excuse for his cowardice and inaction the Resolutions of 1798! Certainly, the great Revolution, which would have consigned such creatures to eternal obscurity, but for the infamy attached to them, came not a moment too soon. To what was that fall, which has no parallel in history, due? To slavery. The great reaction under the Stuarts, which seemed for a time to debase all England, cannot for a moment compare with the utter demoralization of our public men in the time of Buchanan. The English soon became ashamed of their excesses, which were an accidental phase, partly due to the previous pressure and restraint. One reaction simply followed another. But slavery knew no change, and tolerated no compunctions or remorse. It exacted the daily sacrifice upon its altar of the little humanity or patriotism which the leaders of the Northern Democracy might still be supposed to feel. Without moral or political sense on the part of our rulers, the machinery of government refused to move longer. The very existence of society was threatened; and, but for the rise of the Republican Party to rescue the Government from the hands of traitors and imbeciles, we should already be repeating the examples of Mexico and those South American Republics where anarchy and rapine are not the exception, but the rule.

MR. TILDEN'S INFAMOUS RESOLUTION AT THE CHICAGO CONVENTION OF 1864.

The war into which the Nation was plunged by Mr. Tilden and his associates went on. In the dark days that followed, he gave to the cause of freedom and the Union no aid, no sympathy, no cheer. It was an unholy cause, an un-

righteous war. Instead of going to the front, to encourage and sustain our soldiers, everywhere imperilling their lives, and falling in the cause of freedom, of humanity, and of the Union, he remained at home, far from danger, craven and terror-stricken, and hoarse with the cry of Peace! Peace! He would give up all for which so much life and treasure had been sacrificed, and for which so much had been suffered, and place the country still more under the feet of those who had poured contempt upon the Union, and upon the Northern Democracy, and upon none more than on those who, like Mr. Tilden, were traitors, not only to the supreme government, but to their own soil. The Convention at Chicago, in 1864, which nominated Mr. McClellan for the Presidency, again, as in 1860, became his opportunity. As a member of the Convention, he moved for the appointment of a Committee on Resolutions, and was made one of its members. This Committee reported, among others, the *infamous* Resolution, reiterating, in terms, the doctrines of his letter, of which the following is a copy:—

"Resolved, That this Convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that, after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war,—during which, under the pretence of military necessity, or war power, higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private life alike trodden down, and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired,—justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare, demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States, or other peaceable means, to the end, that, at the earliest practical moment, peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal States."

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1864 IN REFERENCE TO THIS RESOLUTION.

The Democratic National Convention of 1864, for the nomination of a candidate for the Presidency, met at Chicago, August 29. The following accounts of the proceedings, as far as relates to the matter of Resolutions or Platform, are copied *verbatim* from the Report of the same, transmitted to and published in the "New York World" of August 30 and August 31:—

"Mr. Tilden, of New York, moved (Aug. 29) that one delegate be appointed by each delegation, to report Resolutions for the consideration of the Convention, and that all Resolutions be referred to said Committee without debate. Carried."

"Mr. Guthrie, Chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, stated (Aug. 30) that several Resolutions offered to said Committee, yesterday, have been referred to a sub-Committee, and there was reason to believe that they would be ready to report this afternoon; and, furthermore,

that there was a fair prospect of arriving at a harmonious conclusion."

"Mr. Tilden, of New York, said that the Chairman of the sub-Committee, General John B. Weller, would probably be ready to report at four o'clock, P.M.; that Mr. Vallandigham was of opinion that they would not be ready at that hour, and that Mr. Guthrie hoped to be ready."

"A motion was made to take a recess till four o'clock."

"Mr. Cass moved to adjourn until to-morrow morning."

Mr. Brown, of Delaware (a member of the Committee), said THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE OF OPINION AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE; nothing but a disposition, perhaps, on the part of a few to procrastinate; and there was no good reason why they should not be ready to report this afternoon.

"Mr. McKeon said he would be in favor of instructing the Committee to report this afternoon. There was no need of further delay. *The sentiments of the members were alike; and, if there was any question at all, it was one of phraseology rather than of principles.*"

"Mr. Vallandigham thought it best to give the Committee further time, being satisfied that by to-morrow morning they will be able to bring in a Report upon which all Democrats and Conservatives in the country can cordially unite."

"Several other members of the Convention said, that, whatever difference of opinion may exist among its members, they are as to the phraseology of the Resolutions rather than to the sentiment; and, if the Convention would immediately take a recess, the Committee would be able to conclude their labors by four o'clock P.M."

"A motion for recess was put and carried."

"Upon the reassembling of the Convention, at four o'clock, Mr. Guthrie stated that the Committee on Resolutions had agreed, and were now ready to report."

"Mr. Cox moved the previous question."

Some discussion followed, but

"Mr. Cox insisted upon his motion, and, the previous question being ordered, the Resolutions were adopted, with but four dissenting votes."

Mr. Tilden, as mover of the Committee on Resolutions, was, by courtesy, entitled to the chairmanship. The following despatch to the "New York World" explains the reasons why Mr. Guthrie was made Chairman:—

"Mr. Samuel J. Tilden, of New York City, was the platform Committee-man selected by the New York Delegation, and, being the mover in the Convention of the Resolution for the appointment of the Committee on the platform (each State naming its man), became, by presumption of parliamentary strength, the Chairman of the Committee itself. The friends of Mr. Vallandigham pressed him for Chairman. Mr. Tilden, however, disclaiming any privilege for himself, Honorable James Guthrie, of Kentucky, was immediately elected by a large majority."

It will be remembered that Vallandigham, the

associate of Mr. Tilden on this Committee, and his co-worker in the Chicago Convention, was drummed out of the Union lines, and sent into the camp of his friends, the rebels, for his notorious disloyalty, and the aid and comfort he gave the enemy.

ENDORSEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION BY THE NEW YORK WORLD.

The great theme with the "New York World," upon the adjournment of the Convention, was its Resolutions or Platform; and, on the 1st of September, 1864, the following appeared in its columns as its leading editorial.

"THE DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM."

"The vigorous, patriotic, and conciliatory declaration of principles adopted at Chicago will be generally acceptable to the party. Not only all Democrats, but all Union-loving Conservatives, no matter of what political antecedents, can stand upon it with honest approbation. The Black Republicans carp at it,—as well they may. It was not made to please them; it is not calculated to promote the success of their party. They complain that it contains no invectives against the South; but it was by invectives against the South that the Union was destroyed. Democrats do not perceive that infuriated rant against the South has any tendency to bring its people to reason. The paramount aim of the Democratic Party is to restore the Union; the announcement of principles is intended to be such that when the South is tired of war, a repentant Union Party will have some tenable ground to stand upon. If they will accept of the Union, we offer them peace. If a controlling majority refuse, we still enable a minority to advocate the old Union without being hooted down; and, under the continued pressure of the war, a Union minority in the South may soon grow to a majority.

"Besides objecting to the platform that it does not denounce those whom we wish to win back to the Union, its Republican critics say it is, in other respects, too negative. It is positive enough for the Union; and positive enough in its condemnation of the obstacles interposed by this recreant administration to the restoration of the Union. The things it insists on lie at the very roots of our Federative Republican system. The things it denounces are the chief dangers which, at the present time, assail that system. Southern arms would be powerless if they were not backed by Southern hatred. While stemming the stream, we aim to close up the fountain. While resisting Southern arms, we would remove all just causes of Southern dissatisfaction. We cannot ask the South, we will not ask anybody, to live contentedly under a government which does not permit free elections, which violates State rights, which throws men into prisons without informing them of their offence or allowing them a trial; which burdens white men with oppressive debt and grinding taxation to try an unconstitutional experiment of giving freedom to negroes. It is

the government which our fathers made and administered, as the Democratic Party through the greater part of seventy years administered it, to which we invite the South to renew their allegiance; and we conceive it that they will prefer this to the prolongation of a civil, fratricidal war. If all do not, a part will; and no rational man has any hope of restoring the Union without the co-operation of a Southern Union Party, which may in time grow to be a majority. The Democratic platform is calculated to remove the main obstacles to the formation of a Southern Union Party. When denunciation of the Confederate Government comes from *that* quarter, it will be of some value; and there is nothing for which the Southern people are so likely to denounce it, as for a refusal to make a reasonable peace, and relieve them from their cruel sufferings. But a proposal for an *abolition* peace can never gain a hearing in the South. If the Abolition Party continue in power, the separation is final, alike in feeling and in fact."

One might well suppose that Mr. Tilden wrote the editorial in the "World," as well as the Resolutions adopted by the Convention; for a more insidious, sneaking, hypocritical apology for the South and attack upon the Union cause than that contained in it, was never penned. It was wholly in keeping with the conduct of that class of nullifiers and disunionists of which Mr. Tilden was the appropriate exponent. How impotent all his plottings and machinations! and how true, applied to him, the burning words of General Jackson to all traitors to their country: "*Its destroyers you cannot be. You may disturb its peace; you may interrupt the course of its prosperity; you may cloud its reputation for stability; but its tranquility will be restored, its prosperity will return, and the stain upon its national character will be transferred, and remain an eternal blot on the memory of those who caused the disorder.*"

THE SOUTH COERCED INTO THE UNION.

The cause of the Union and of freedom at last triumphed. The South was subdued, *coerced* back into the Union, nationality was restored by the sword, and the great obstacle to a true union, slavery, destroyed, in spite of all the efforts, the predictions, and the hopes of the Tildens, the Woods, the Buchanans, and the whole of that disloyal crew in which they stood conspicuous. Had Jackson lived and been at the head of affairs, not a few of them would have graced the gallows, or have been compelled to fly for escape to foreign lands. Calhoun was a model of patriotism and honor compared with them. He made a law which might have been, and perhaps was, justly obnoxious, the ground of secession. Tilden made the maintenance

of the most accursed system that the world has ever seen—"the sum of all villanies"—his cause for secession, adding to his traitorous instincts an utter want of sympathy with oppressed humanity.

MR. TILDEN'S ARRAIGNMENT OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY ON THE SLAVERY QUESTION.

While Mr. Tilden proclaimed, on all occasions, the abstract right of the South to secede, the ground on which he justified the movement in which he was engaged was the conduct of the Republican party on the subject of slavery. He makes up his indictment by quotations from the speeches made by Mr. Seward and Mr. Lincoln in the canvass then pending. "The rôle," he said, "of moral right and duty which may be fairly said to be adopted by the Republican party is stated by Mr. Seward at Lansing."

"I will favor," said Mr. Seward, "as long as I can within the limits of constitutional action, the decrease and limitation of African slavery."

"This sentiment," says Mr. Tilden, "runs through all Mr. Seward's speeches, and is, I think, the master-key to the whole argument by which the Republican leaders address the popular mind." He then proceeds to fortify his original charge, by giving the following quotations from different speeches made by Mr. Seward:—

"We do not *vote*," says Mr. Seward, "against slavery in Virginia. We do not authorize Abraham Lincoln or the Congress of the United States to *pass any laws* about slavery in Virginia."

"It is by a simple rule that I have studied the Constitution, which rule is, that no human being, no race, should be kept down in their efforts to rise to a higher state of liberty and happiness."

"It is true that they (the fathers) necessarily and wisely modified this policy of free loim, by leaving it to the several States, affected as they were by different circumstances, to abolish slavery in their own way and at their own pleasure, instead of confiding that duty to Congress."

"But the very nature of these modifications fortifies my position, that the fathers knew that the *two systems could not endure within the Union*, and expected that within a short period slavery would disappear for ever. Moreover, in order that these modifications might not altogether defeat their grand design of a republic maintaining *universal equality*, they provided that *two-thirds of the States might amend the Constitution*."

"It remains to say on this point only one word, to guard against misapprehension. If these States are to again become universally slaveholding, I do not pretend to say with what violations of the Constitution that end shall be accomplished. On the other hand, while I do confidently believe and hope that my country will yet become a land of universal freedom, I do not expect that it will be made so otherwise than

through the action of the several States co-operating with the Federal Government, and all acting in strict conformity with their respective constitutions. I will favor, as long as I can, within the limits of constitutional action, the decrease and diminution of African slavery in all the States."

He quotes to the same effect from speeches of Mr. Lincoln, whose speeches, he says, are full of denunciations of "the further spread of slavery," the restriction of which will, he predicts, "place it where the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction." "We know," says he, "the opening of new countries tends to the perpetuation of the institution, and so does keep men in slavery who would otherwise be free." "Nothing," he again says, "will make you successful, but setting up a policy which shall treat the thing as wrong." . . . "This government is expressly charged with the duty of providing for the general welfare. We believe that the spreading out and perpetuity of the institution of slavery impairs the general welfare." . . . "To repress this thing, we think, is providing for the general welfare."

The italics, in the preceding quotations from Mr. Seward's speeches, are Mr. Tilden's. In commenting upon them, he replies:—

"The mode provided by the Constitution for its own amendment, is not accurately stated by Mr. Seward in the above extract, but the plan of applying it so as to abolish slavery within the States is sufficiently disclosed. In a recent speech, he proposes to absolutely exclude from admission into the Union all new States having slaves, and to apply our northern system to all new States; evidently looking to the multiplication of the free States until their number shall enable them to alter the Constitution, and 'the grand design of a republic maintaining universal equality' shall be consummated, without the consent and in defiance of the will of the Southern States."

WISDOM AND NECESSITY OF THE REPUBLICAN ORGANIZATION.

Could any sentiments be more just, humane, or wise than those upon which Mr. Seward and Mr. Lincoln proclaimed the Republican party to be founded? Was it not desirable that African slavery should come to an end? Was it not proper that the Constitution should be invoked for such an object? Our fathers provided for the amendment of that instrument to meet any great inconvenience or grievance, not sufficiently provided against. If, in such matter, two-thirds of the States propose, and three-fourths ratify, must not the minority of one-fourth, yield? Is not this a government of majorities? Does not a minority of one always have to yield, on all

occasions, to a majority of one? If there could be no progress, no change, the nation would surely die. An inexorable code is always death. All codes and all constitutions must change with the change of the national life. The code of the ten tables, the foundation of, and at one time the only source of, Roman law, almost wholly disappeared in the subsequent codes of the Empire. The English Constitution always yields to supreme necessity. Our Constitution can only yield to such necessity by its formal amendment. This was the only way, the only mode, at the time, by which the question of slavery could be met. It was in harmony with the instrument itself, with the habits and thoughts of our people, and with that necessity of progress, consequently of change, inherent in our race. There was no suggestion of unfair dealing or covert design. Every thing was open and manly. Whether the object sought to be gained was wise, humane, and useful, I will not at this late day attempt to show. The demonstration transcends words.

But Mr. Tilden joins issue, not only on the constitutionality, but the *policy*, of such an amendment. He would keep the negro perpetually in chains, as a matter of principle, for the benefit of the white race, and as the best condition of the black. "They (the Republicans) ask," he says, "Have we not a right to elect a President in a constitutional manner by our own votes?" "You have," he replies, "in obedience to the fundamental ideas of our *Confederation*, no more moral right to do so on the basis of your present party organization than you have to do a thousand other things which the laws and Constitution allow, but which reason, justice, public policy, and fraternal sympathy, forbid."

"The Northern States," he continues, "have a direct and important interest in keeping the natural course of their emigration into the territories substantially undisturbed, with freedom to such of their people as overflow into the territories to establish in their new seats such systems of industry and society as they have been accustomed to at home.

"The Southern States have exactly the same interest. Both have an indirect interest in the formation of new States, as it affects the balance of power between the two classes in the Confederation."

Balance of power between the two classes of the Confederation! What two classes? Slave and free. Then we are a nation of *classes*, not of individuals. Has it come to this, that we must nurture and maintain on our own soil the antagonisms and rivalries of the Old World, for which millions of men are kept constantly under arms, and which stand as the great blot upon, and the great obstacle to, the prog-

ress of humanity? What kind of a Government, and what kind of a nation, is this, in which the different members are to checkmate, overreach, and, if they cannot succeed in this way, to attack and destroy each other? Is this Mr. Tilden's statesmanship, of which he makes such boast, — this the kind of Nation whose affairs he is to be called upon to administer? God, in his infinite mercy, forbid!

MR. TILDEN DECLARES THAT THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT MUST END IN UTTER FAILURE AND DISGRACE.

But suppose the Republican party elects Mr. Lincoln, what then? "I will tell you," says Mr. Tilden.

"The Southern States," to quote from his letter, "will not, by any possibility, accept the avowed creed of the Republican Party as the permanent policy of the federative government as to slavery, either in the States or Territories. . . .

"Nothing short of the recession of the Republican party to the point of total and absolute non-action on the subject of slavery in the States and Territories could enable it to reconcile to itself the people of the South. Even then it would have great and fixed antipathies to overcome; and men and parties act chiefly from habit. . . .

"Will the Republican Party submit itself to this inevitable necessity to revolutionize its whole character? To attempt this change, and not to perish as a dominant party, is barely possible. Not to attempt and accomplish it, and yet to live as an ascendant power in our Union, is totally impossible. . . .

"It must travel through the entire cycle of retrogression, and demonstrate that its existence in its present form was a mistake. . . .

"What will Mr. Lincoln do? Can he be expected, as President, to understand the state of things in any other sense than that of his own partisan policy? Can he avoid the attempt to maintain the power of his party by the same means which will have acquired it? Can he emancipate himself from the dominion of the ideas, associations, and influences which will have accompanied him in his rise to power? Can he be expected to act in any new direction with sufficient breadth of view and firmness of purpose?

"If he shall fail adequately to respond to these great exigencies, the inevitable result, as it presents itself to my judgment, has been already sufficiently indicated. . . .

"Elect Lincoln, and we invite those perils which we cannot measure; we attempt in vain to conquer the submission of the South to an impracticable and intolerable policy; our only hope must be, that, as President, he will abandon the creed, the principles, and pledges on which he will have been elected. . . .

"Defeat Lincoln, and all our great interests and hopes are, unquestionably, safe.

"If thus, or in any mode, we escape the perils of which his election will be the signal, our noble ship of state will issue forth from the breakers now foaming around and ahead, and spring forward into the open sea in all the majesty of her strength and beauty."

"But if the Providence which has hitherto guided and guarded our country shall at last abandon us to our foolish and wicked strifes, I behold a far different scene."

THE SUCCESS ACHIEVED.

Unintimidated by this fearful picture of ruin and woe, the Republicans did elect Mr. Lincoln President of the United States. The Southern States seceded. War followed. The rebellion was utterly subdued. The Union was not only preserved, but, by the removal of the cause of the rebellion, was made stronger than ever. The seceding States were only too glad to re-enter it, exclaiming like the prodigal son: "I have sinned against Heaven and in thy sight, and am no more worthy to be called thy son." The worst place in the Union was infinitely better than the best place outside of it.

UTTER FAILURE OF ALL MR. TILDEN'S PREDICTIONS.

Not a prediction of this great philosopher and statesman was realized. He estimated the character of the North by that of the degraded populace of New York; of the poltroons that hung round the purlieus of Tammany Hall. In his view of the ordering of human affairs, God had no place or hand. Tammany Hall was his deity, — his all in all. The result was to be what Tammany Hall would have achieved. He wholly counted out of the struggle the sense of duty in the human soul. He knew the impotence of Tammany Hall for such a contest, and knew nothing better. Is this statesmanship? What is statesmanship but the recognition of a Divine rule to which all human conduct must conform; and an attempt to direct all life, public and private, according to that rule? Was it statesmanship to plunge the States into a fratricidal war, — a war which wasted the fields of the South, decimated its people, received and inflicted a waste and loss which a generation cannot restore? If this is statesmanship, it is an inspiration borrowed from Satan himself.

MR. LINCOLN'S STATESMANSHIP.

Compare this statesmanship with that displayed by Mr. Lincoln in his second inaugural message.

"On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughts were anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it; all sought to avert it. While the inaugural address

was being delivered from this place, devoted altogether to *saving* the Union without war, insurgent agents were in the city seeking to *destroy* it without war, — seeking to dissolve the Union, and divide effects by negotiation. Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would *make* war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would *accept* war rather than let it perish. And the war came.

"One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest, was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union, even by war, while the Government claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement of it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes His aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered; that of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has his own purposes, 'Woe unto the world because of offences! for it must needs be that offences come: but woe unto that man by whom the offence cometh!' If we shall suppose American slavery is one of those offences which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed time He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offence came, shall we discern therein any departure from those Divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.'

"With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle; and for his widow and his orphan; to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations."

What was Mr. Lincoln's statesmanship? The recognition of a Providence in human affairs, —

of a Law, far higher than that of man's choice, and an obligation, or duty, to obey this Law, no matter at what cost. And was there not a Providence that sustained our country, and, through terrible trial and suffering, guided it at last to glorious victory, — not by immolating myriads of our fellow-beings upon the altar of an insatiable avarice and lust, but by raising and elevating them, so that, in time, they may hail, in the spirit in which it was proclaimed, the words of the Great Charter of human freedom which so thrilled the world a hundred years ago, that "all men have an equal right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Was there ever a higher statesmanship than Mr. Lincoln's, and did ever one reap so rich a reward? This was a statesmanship to which Mr. Tilden was wholly blind. All Europe, echoing him, predicted the ignominious failure of our government in its contest against such apparently overwhelming odds, — an united South excited to the highest pitch of rage, allied to the traitors and malcontents so numerous at the North, all seeking to "*rend*" the Union that slavery might spread itself over our fair domain. How were all these predictions falsified, the schemes of the conspirators brought to naught, their armies broken in pieces, and the Union restored upon the basis of equal rights to all, by Him who at last heard the cry of his people that for one hundred and fifty years had groaned beneath the oppressor's lash! If in the future we would do any thing worthy a great nation, — of the hopes of humanity, — is Mr. Lincoln's statesmanship, or that of Mr. Tilden, born of Tammany Hall and of the lowest and most selfish instincts of our nature, to become our inspiration and guide?

Mr. Tilden, in his letter of acceptance, will undoubtedly be loud in denouncing the financial policy of the Republicans, and in vaunting his own, carefully avoiding the record of his political life. But for him and the like of him we should have had no war, and no financial policy to denounce. Would not his statesmanship have been far better employed in preventing the evils under which the nation is now laboring, than in proposing his nostrums for their cure? Can there be statesmanship without a nation?

MR. TILDEN THE MOST OBNOXIOUS PERSON IN THE NATION TO ALL PRINCIPLES OF ORDER AND GOOD GOVERNMENT.

Certainly no man in the country is so obnoxious to all the principles and ideas which should, and do, characterize the better portion of our people, and especially to the Republican Party, as Mr. Tilden. His nomination reversed all the issues

which involved such a waste of life and treasure, and such unspeakable suffering. The effect of his election would be to undo all that had, in principle, been accomplished by the war. It would be far worse than was the election of Polk, in whose administration the secession element finally got full control of the Government; for the presidency of Tyler was an accident, and, though himself a secessionist, he had no following. The election of General Taylor was also an accident, growing out of a quarrel in the Democracy for the spoils. Even Mr. Tilden, in his letter, says, that no principle, only spoils, was involved in the movement which nominated Van Buren for the third time, and in which he took a conspicuous part. With Pierce, the old dynasty was restored to power by a majority which had no parallel in our history. So rapid had been the process of demoralization that all sections and wings of the party, North and South, united upon a man who, when elected, incarnated the slaveholders' highest idea. But the slaveholders soon tired of him, and, with that inconstancy which always characterizes such a class, remorsefully "whistled him down the wind," when his four years had expired. Buchanan, whom they took in his place, was still worse. The rebels at the expiration of his term, regarded his paltering imbecility with still greater contempt than the Republicans. Polk, Pierce, and Buchanan, all illustrate the common fate of men who, in affairs, ignore the sentiments of humanity and of justice. As a penalty, men are always bereft of all wisdom to act, when they have lost all sense of duty and obligation to a higher power. In Tilden is concentrated all that was wrong-headed, perverse, unpatriotic, and inhumane in all three of his predecessors. His election would fully restore that corrupt and effete dynasty which, in the triumph of Lincoln, was with such scorn and indignation hurled from power.

Is the country sufficiently recovered from the effects of the war that it can afford to put the high priest of secession at the head of the Government? Suppose the Southern people should some day take it into their heads not to pay their quota of the interest or principle of the debt which was created to subdue them. What could Mr. Tilden do to coerce them into payment? Coercion with him would be the "violation of the Constitution in every part." If a crisis came, would he not become as imbecile and emasculated as Buchanan, or Pierce, or Polk? Such a crisis may speedily happen. The State of Alabama, soon after the war, went into the Northern markets, and borrowed \$20,000,000 on

her bonds, and with the money constructed 1,000 miles of railroad, in order to "develop her resources." These bonds are largely held by Northern savings-banks. They have all been repudiated for no other reason than it does not suit her dignity or convenience to pay them! A sponge has been put over the whole. In this case the people of the State received full consideration,—a dollar in hand for every dollar promised to be repaid; and in fact received five-fold consideration in a magnificent system of public works which this money served to construct. How long will such a people stand the debt of the United States after they get into power? Not an hour. They could, following Mr. Tilden's law, plead the very Constitution in full bar to any claim to be made upon them. "Coercion was without warrant in law: the contract to pay was made under duress. The State was unconstitutionally driven and held out of the Union when the debt was contracted." No action would hold morally or legally with such a defence. Mr. Tilden as judge would have to admit the defence, and give judgment accordingly. If the South are to be let off, why not the North? Admit Mr. Tilden's construction, and the Constitution is feeble than any rope of sand.

MR. TILDEN THE POLITICAL REFORMER.

Do reformers circulate such documents as the following?

"ROOMS OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE,
Oct. 27, 1868.

"MY DEAR SIR, — Please at once to communicate with some reliable person in three or four principal towns, and in each city of your county; and request him (*expenses duly arranged for this end*) to telegraph to WILLIAM M. TWEED, Tammany Hall, at the MINUTE OF CLOSING THE POLLS, *not waiting for the count*, such person's estimate of the vote. Let the telegraph be as follows: 'This town will show Democratic gain (or loss) over last year of — (number).' Or this one, if sufficiently certain: 'This town will give a Republican (or Democratic) majority of —.' There is, of course, an important object to be attained by a *simultaneous transmission at the hour of closing the polls, but not longer waiting*. Opportunity can be taken of the usual half-hour lull in telegraphic communication over lines before actual results begin to be declared, and before the Associated Press absorb the telegraph with returns, and interfere with individual messages, and GIVE ORDERS TO WATCH CAREFULLY THE COUNT.

"Very truly yours,

"SAMUEL J. TILDEN,
"Chairman."

What was the object in ascertaining how the towns outside the city of New York had gone the moment the polls in them were closed? To

create fraudulent votes in the City of New York, in number sufficient to overbalance any majority that the country might throw. In the country, one need not wait till the votes are counted to know the result. There every man's preference is known, and freely expressed. The yearly canvass taken in New Hampshire, completed a week before election, has never failed to show the final result, within one thousand votes, in a poll of seventy-five thousand. So in the agricultural counties of the State of New York. It is as substantially known what the result will be days before the election as when it is actually declared. Far different are the lower wards of the City of New York, where no one knows who the voters are, nor how many. Two things, however, are always known: they will cast just as many votes as Tammany Hall dictates, and for just the person that Tammany Hall names; it can have twenty thousand votes with the same ease that it can have five thousand or ten thousand. Mr. Greeley, when in the Constitutional Convention with Mr. Tilden, endeavored to do something to stop the gigantic evil of fraudulent voting in the City of New York. Failing in this, he made a personal appeal to Mr. Tilden, in an open letter, which appeared in the columns of the "Tribune," under date of Oct. 20, 1869, to put a stop to it.

LETTER OF MR. GREELEY TO MR. TILDEN.

"LETTER TO A POLITICIAN."

"TO SAMUEL J. TILDEN,
CHAIRMAN DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE.

"SIR, — You hold a most responsible and influential position in the councils of a great party. You could make that party content itself with the polling of legal votes, if you only would. In our late Constitutional Convention, I tried to erect some fresh barriers against election frauds, — did you? The very little that I was enabled to effect in this direction I shall try to have ratified by the people at our ensuing election, — will you? Mr. Tilden, you cannot escape responsibility by saying, with the guilty Macbeth,

"Thou canst not say I did it: never shake
Those gory locks at me!"

for you were, at least, a passive accomplice in the giant frauds of last November. Your name was used, without public protest on your part, in circulars sowed broadcast over the State, whereof the manifest intent was to make assurance doubly sure that the frauds here perpetrated should not be overborne by the honest vote of the rural districts. And you, not merely by silence, but by positive assumption, have covered those frauds with the mantle of your respectability. On the principle that 'the receiver is as bad as the thief,' you are as deeply implicated in them to-day as though your name were Tweed, O'Brien, or Oakey Hall.

"And, though our city has since largely in-

creased its population, the *lower wards* were quite as populous then (1840) as they are to-day, — several of them more so. . . .

"Now look at the vote of four of these Wards in 1840 and 1868 respectively: —

	President, 1840.		Governor, 1868.	
Four Wards.	4,793	5,521	2,840	20,283

Van Buren's majority, 726; Hoffman's majority, 17,443.

"Mr. Tilden, you know what this contrast attests. Right well do you comprehend the means whereby the vote of 1868 was thus swelled out of all proportions. There are not 12,000 legal voters living in those wards to-day, though they gave Hoffman 17,443 majority. Had the day been of average length, it would doubtless have been swelled to at least 20,000. There was nothing but time needed to make it 100,000, — *if so many had been wanted and paid for.* Now, Mr. Tilden, I call on you to put a stop to this business. You have but to walk into the sheriff's, the Mayor's, and the Supervisor's offices, in the City Hall Park, and say that there must be no more of it; SAY IT SO THAT THERE SHALL BE NO DOUBT THAT YOU MEAN IT, and we shall have a tolerably fair election once more.

"Will you do it? If we Republicans are swindled again, as we were swindled last Fall, you and such as you will be responsible to God and man for the outrage.

"Yours,
"NEW YORK, Oct. 20, 1869."

HORACE GREELEY.

Although the circulars to which Mr. Tilden's name was attached, had been previously published by the Tribune, and fully implicated him in the frauds charged, yet he was as silent under the accusation as a stone. Had he been innocent of the charge, and had he been desirous of purging the ballot-boxes, he would instantly have come to the front, demanded an investigation, and volunteered to go all lengths in their correction. But had he done so, he never would have been Governor of the State of New York, nor would he have had the least show for the Presidency. He, of all men, was the most interested in perpetuating them, as a means of climbing to political power.

MR. TILDEN THE REFORMER OF MUNICIPAL CORRUPTION.

Mr. Tilden the municipal reformer! When was that discovery made? The first ever heard of him in that relation was after the exposure of his old friend and confidant, Tweed; Tweed had acquired an enormous fortune by his robberies. Every man in New York was interested in making him disgorge, — the keepers of gambling-houses, according to their means,

equally with merchant princes, for the purpose of lightening their taxes. After the frauds of Tweed and his associates had been discovered, it became the fashion to pursue such sort of game. Tilden joined the crowd, and in the hue-and-cry. He, from his connection with the railroads, was almost as suddenly gorged with wealth as Tweed; as a very rich man, it was for his interest to catch the thief who had broken into his enclosure. His spirit of reform was precisely that of a Turkish Bashaw, who occasionally takes off the heads of a few of his followers and officials, for no other reason than that they have taken to themselves more than their full share of the plunder. The difference between him who loses his head and him that keeps it is luck,—the accidental possession of power. Tilden's love of reform never went an inch beyond this. If he were such a reformer, there was no need to wait sixty years for an opportunity. There were plenty in the city of New York. There was Tammany Hall, of which he has so long been a member, which has done more to corrupt the politics and debauch the morals of the country than any ten other causes put together, slavery excepted. Tammany Hall a reformer! It has been seething in corruption for a half century past. What are reforms? Temperance: a mitigation of social abuses by which the laboring man may be better fed, sheltered, and clothed; which shall prevent his dwelling from being the hot-bed of disease; which shall give to the children of the poorer classes an occasional breath of fresh air and a sight of green fields; which shall make provision for those who, from any cause, are no longer able to care for themselves; which shall train those for whom reforms are inaugurated, to take them up and carry them forward; and, more than all, which shall attack in every manner possible that evil of evils,—that curse of all curses,—slavery. If that be dead and gone, are there not still crying evils and abuses to fight against, as firmly intrenched, and perilous to attack, as was slavery? If a man saw in that monstrous wrong nothing to condemn; if, on the contrary, it was to be encouraged to spread itself over the whole land; if, for its support, the Government was to be broken up, and the fairest hope of humanity destroyed,—is he likely to have much of the spirit of a reformer in his blood? When such a man moves, it is always from interest or policy; never from sympathy with any good cause. The true reformer is always, in the outset, in a minority,—often wholly alone in battling against some gigantic abuse, hoary and reverend with age. When he has brought the world over to his side, he ceases, in that particular, to be the reformer.

Show us an instance in which Tilden has taken the reformer's first part! If a member of Tammany Hall steal any of its property, are the other members made reformers by seeking to recover it, or by punishing the thief? If persons employed in a gambling-house should steal and carry off the implements of their trade, would its owners be reformers for seeking to reclaim them? Yet such are the precise grounds upon which Tilden bases all his right to be called one. It is as impossible that he, with his surroundings, should have been a reformer as that the Sultan should. Is it a reformer's instinct to crib with such fellows as Tweed, Field, Connolly, and Genet, and a host of that ilk? How did all these men get their power and plunder? By playing like Mr. Tilden, upon the prejudices and passions of the ignorant and degraded populace of the city of New York. In that city, the rôle of a great leader is very simple and easy,—to glory over the beauties of Democracy, and to stuff it with bad whiskey. Such a populace are the tools of Mr. Tilden's trade,—the counters by which he hopes to reach the highest office in the gift of the people. All he wants is votes; and he is twice as sure of them so long as those who cast them remain ignorant and degraded, as he would be if they became intelligent and acted upon their own convictions. The moment they gain such a position, his occupation is gone, and his political aspirations vanish in empty air.

IS TILDEN THE FIT MAN FOR PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Is this the man to fill the seat once occupied by Washington and Jackson? Imagine him in the Presidential Chair, with these august figures on either side of him. The scorn of Washington might be shown by his majestic silence; but how would the eyes of Jackson glare with fury on the man who had been guilty, in a tenfold degree, if possible, of the crime for which he always regretted he had not hung Calhoun, and who, by helping to make secession a fact, had thrilled the chord nearest the old hero's heart. Will the nation honor such a man with the highest office in its gift? Will those whose lives were long spent amid persecution and obloquy, in the battle against slavery, help to raise to the Presidency him who was, of all others, the great advocate and support of that accursed system which it cost so many sacrifices, and so much blood and treasure, to overthrow? Are those fathers who sent their sons to die on the battle-field, or to return home, if they escaped, only to drag out a miserable existence from the effect of wounds, or diseases caught in camp, to do homage to one of

the chief instruments of their bereavements, and of the living deaths which they still see on every side? Will the soldiers themselves, take as their standard-bearer the man who did more than any other to precipitate the rebellion; who gave it all his countenance and moral support; who, when they were confronting the enemy in the field, was threatening their rear with a still more dangerous enemy, — encouragement of secession at the *North*; and who proclaimed far and wide that all their sacrifices and heroism had resulted and could result only in defeat and shame? Will the young men coming forward to take upon themselves the duties and responsibilities of life and of public affairs, full of life and generous hope, take for their guide and example the man who has always been allied with that element of American life from which our political and social corruptions have almost wholly sprung, and who has never displayed the least interest or sympathy in those questions which more deeply concerned their own welfare and that of society? Is such to be the ideal, — “the coming man”? If so, God save the country, for which there is no human help. Is there not something better for their inspiration and imitation than slavery, the Resolutions of 1798, the right of secession, or the drunken orgies of Tammany Hall? Do not they want a government which shall throw its broad ægis over them, in whatever part of our wide domain they may happen to be placed? If not, we cannot too soon cast in our lot with Mexico, and with those South American States, where anarchy is the rule, and where life is hardly worth the possession. Would not the election of Mr. Tilden, in view of the past as well as the future, sound a lower depth in our political history than has yet been touched? Would

it not show that we had no government worth preserving; no humanity; no political principles but the right of secession; no aspirations for a higher and purer system and life than that which allies us with slavery, with all its degradation and crimes? If nothing better be in store for us, we cannot too soon commit ourselves to the downward current, if only to escape the shame which our corruptions and demoralizations yet excite, but which is powerless for our rescue.

This present year is our National Centennial Birthday! Had Mr. Tilden been able, the eighty-fourth year of our national life would have been its last. Shall we desecrate this birthday, which every one is celebrating with such earnestness and joy, by electing as our Chief Magistrate a man who proclaims that our national existence may at any moment be brought to an end, by the fancied interests, the caprice, or the whim of any one of its members? that the nation of to-day may cease to be the nation of to-morrow? that its life hangs upon a single thread, which any State, ill-affected for the moment, may sever? Are we, by one act, to undo all that is glorious in our history, all that is valuable in our acquisitions and achievements, and show ourselves to the world a people without principle, without conviction, without aspiration, driven hither and thither by every lawless impulse, as if to verify the predictions of the enemies of freedom that Republics are but the nurseries of license and insubordination, and have only to run their course to destroy the fairest hopes of humanity? Shall we not rather crown the year with an utterance which shall go round the world to cheer the heart of every lover of freedom, that “**THE NATION, NOT THE STATES, IS SUPREME.**”

THE UNION! ITS DANGERS!!

AND HOW THEY CAN BE AVERTED.

LETTER FROM SAMUEL J. TILDEN

TO

HON. WILLIAM KENT.

To the Hon. William Kent:

DEAR SIR: Among my early memories of public affairs, during the tariff and nullification controversies, I recollect the illustrious name of your father, James Kent, signed to a call for a meeting of the citizens of New York, to recommend to Congress the adoption of measures of conciliation towards our brethren of the South. The association recurs to my mind as often as I think of your name on the Union electoral ticket, which I consider a most wise and necessary endeavor to rescue our country in a far more perilous political conjuncture. I had no agency in putting it there; but I know it represents no partisan interest, prejudice, or passion, no man's vanity or ambition, and still less any illiberal opinion or feeling towards natives of foreign lands who have chosen this for their home. It represents nothing less worthy or less noble than patriotic devotion to the country, and serious and well-considered solicitude for the welfare of the hitherto fortunate people of these, as yet, United States. I share the sentiments which animate you in the present crisis. I recall your desire, when last we met, that I should express to our citizens the convictions often avowed to you. An occasion has arisen which commits me to do so. I have chosen the form of a letter; I dedicate that letter to you. It is a testimony of my respect and affection, and that we think the same things concerning our country. Your interest in the great theme will compensate all deficiencies in the offering.

THE USE OF PARTIES.

The tendency of parties is to draw the various political elements into two divisions, and to equalize those divisions. The minority adopts enough of the ideas of the majority to attract those who are nearest to the line of division; and the majority, in struggling to retain them, makes concessions. The issue is thus constantly shifting "with the wavering tide of battle," until the policy which at last prevails has become adjusted so as nearly to represent the average sense of the whole people. It is rare in our political experience that the difference between the majority and the minority equals five per cent of the whole number; extremely rare except in cases where the issue on which the parties

form is made up to suit specially some locality. In shaping the policy which emerges from the conflict, the minority acts a part scarcely less important than the majority; and the dissentients are thus prepared to accept the result.

THE PROCESS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT.

Such is the process by which the will of all the parts of the community is collected, averaged, and represented in the policy finally agreed upon. This is the method of self-government.

WHY SELF-GOVERNMENT IS BEST.

The reason why self-government is better than government by any one man, or by a foreign people, is that the policy evolved by this process is generally better adapted to the actual condition of the society on which it is to operate. Government by one man often fails to understand, but it usually defers. Government by a foreign people neither understands nor defers. It has no adaptation to the wants or temper of the governed. It is, therefore, about the worst government that can be imagined.

THE FEDERATIVE SYSTEM OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

Our fathers understood this truth. They had tried the experiment. They had been driven to revolution by George the Third, said to be the "most honest man in his own dominions," and by the genial Lord North, and had seen how cordially the British people sustained whatever was worst in all the policy of monarch and minister. They foresaw that a single government, exercising all the powers of society over the people destined to occupy so vast a region as the United States, and embracing the elements of such diversities of interest, industry, opinion, habits and manners, would be intolerable to bear, and impossible to continue. They, therefore, largely adopted the federative idea in the mixed system which they established; and vesting only the powers appertaining to our foreign relations and to certain specified common objects of a domestic nature in a federative agency, they left the great residuary mass of governmental functions to the several states.

ANOMALOUS CHARACTER OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.

In the practical working of this beautiful but complex system, the Republican party is a phenomenon, new and startling. It is the first instance in which any partisan organization has been able to compete, with any prospect of success, for ascendancy in our federative government, without being national in its structure, without being composed of majorities—or of minorities able to compete effectively with majorities—in all the states of both great sections of the Union. The Republican party has no practical existence in all the fifteen southern states. In a few points, where the five border states touch the North, it has a nominal existence, but without any appreciable power over the opinion or action of those states. In the ten other states it has no affiliations whatever.

THAT SECTIONAL CHARACTER INHERENT.

This condition of things is not an accident. It is the result of five years of earnest discussion before the southern people of the character and objects of the Republican party. It is produced against the strongest motives which influence the formation of party connections. Ties of ancient association between most of its members, and the dissevered minorities of the South—fragments of the old whig party, anxious to beat their local rivals, and impelled towards alliances by the instinct of self-preservation; common opposition to an existing administration; the prospect of common success, and of sharing in a political ascendancy,—all these potential causes united have utterly failed to draw to it any considerable numbers of adherents in all the South, against the pervading, immense, overwhelming public opinion of all those states.

I speak not now of causes. I simply state the fact. Our Republican friends will say that their policy is misunderstood by the southern people. There is undoubtedly a serious misunderstanding between the Republican party and the whole southern people. In what does this misunderstanding consist? It is easier for the Republican party to mistake as to the effects of its policy on the interests of the South, than for the whole southern people to mistake the real nature of that policy.

I am apt to pay some respect to the unanimous opinion of great commonwealths on a question peculiarly affecting themselves.

REPUBLICAN ASCENDANCY IS PRACTICALLY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

If such an organization as the Republican party should acquire complete possession of the federative government, what sort of a system would it be? To the people of the fifteen states it would be a *foreign government*. It would be erected over them through the forms of their constitution; but that would not affect its practical character. None of

their citizens would have concurred in bringing the administration into existence. None of their public opinion would be represented in that administration.

PERILOUS SUBJECT OF THE CONTROVERSY.

Now, what is the question between the eighteen northern states and the fifteen southern states of the confederacy, out of which arises a state of things so novel and so extraordinary?

It is a controversy,—(how far of mere opinion and how far operating practically, I will presently discuss),—it is a controversy which touches the relations of two races, being eight and a half millions of whites and four millions of blacks, composing all the population of these fifteen states; relations which constitute a whole system of industry, furnishing their staple exports and their exchanges with us and with all the world; relations which thus involve a vast interest in property—not less than three thousand millions of dollars—permeating these fifteen states; relations which are the basis of the habits of families and of society in all these commonwealths, and of their social order, a shock to which is associated in the mind of the dominant race, with a pervading sense of danger to the life of every human being and the honor of every woman.

This nature of the subject matter, out of which the controversy arises, explains and accounts for a state of parties so anomalous. Such a disorder in the voluntary machinery by which popular government is carried on, is in itself serious; but it is more important as a symptom of a malady in the body-politic, deeply seated and far more dangerous.

SECTIONALISM OF PARTIES.

Sectionalism of parties has hitherto never gone beyond a little predominance of a party in the states of one section and a little predominance of the other party in the states of another section. In that mild form its tendency alarmed the heroic mind of Washington, and drew from him an impressive warning in his Farewell Address. Sectionalism is now threatening to become absolute in a predominance of a party in eighteen states which has no practical existence in fifteen states.

Sectionalism of parties has hitherto been founded in differences upon subjects comparatively unimportant. It touched nothing deeper than the details of a tariff, when it called out all the patriotic courage and energy of Jackson to avert its dangers.

Sectionalism is now founded upon differences of opinion reaching to the very structure of civil society in fifteen states.

With the prudent and conservative Monroe mediating at the head of the government, and with Clay in the House of Representatives, exerting for pacification all his matchless power over assemblies, sectionalism, not of popular parties, but in Congress, on a question like the present, though, in the mitigated form of the Missouri controversy, woke

Jefferson, as he expressed it, "like a fire-bell at night," from the repose of his retirement, and made him for the first time almost despair of the republic. Sectionalism on a question of the same nature is now worn into the minds of the people by five years of organized agitation. It has become the sole basis of existing party divisions, and threatens to seize all the powers of the government.

Each of the elements of evil, which, of a feeblér type, and in an incipient state, filled these heroes and statesmen of our revolutionary and constitutional era with apprehension, is now grown to a magnitude which they could never have conceived; and these elements, thus grown, are conjoined into one monstrous malady. And yet every shallow sophister who can pen a line for the skimming eye of thoughtless readers, wiser than Washington, braver than Jackson, more skilled in our complex government than Jefferson, scoffs at the danger, and scoffs at all who see it as insincere or timid!

EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE FOR DISUNION.

A sectional division, upon a sectional issue, of the great parties which organize and represent the conflicting opinions of society, and which compete for the control of the machinery of government in a system of confederated states, rapidly and effectually educates the people for disunion.

It is not the ordinary case of party excitements between citizens united in the same community. There, misapprehensions are removed and animosities assuaged by mutual contact; adversaries mingle in the transactions of business and in the intercourse of society; meet at the same church in a common worship, and on a thousand occasions of familiar and friendly association; they are brought together and kept together by common friends; they are interlaced with each other by the numberless ties which spring up, and grow around, and grow over individuals living in one community; they cannot move their houses, shops, or farms; they cannot tear asunder the social ligaments which bind them together.

Now imagine parties such as we have often known them, in their mutual misapprehensions and mutual injustice, and their passionate animosities; one party dominating in eighteen states on one side of a geographical line, and the other composing the whole people of fifteen states on the other side of that line. They know each other only through their excited imaginations. The antipathies of each are directed against a distant people. Each is organized into states, with complete governments, holding the purse and wielding the sword. They are held together only by a compact of confederation.

FEDERATIVE SYSTEM INCREASES SUCH DANGERS.

Will their mutual animosities be equally safe, equally harmless as the party controversies of individuals united in one community? The strain, the shock of the collision between these organized masses, must be vastly greater. The single, slender, con-

ventional tie which holds states in confederation, has no strength compared with the compacted, intertwining fibres which bind the atoms of human society into one formation of natural growth.

The masters in political science who constructed our system, preserved the state governments as bulwarks of the freedom of individuals and localities against oppression from centralized power. They recognized no right of constitutional secession, but they left revolution organized, whenever it should be demanded by the public opinion of a state; left it with power to snap the tie of confederation as a nation might break a treaty, and to repel coercion as a nation might repel invasion. They caused us to depend, in a great measure, upon the public opinion of the states in order to maintain a confederated Union. They intended to make it necessary for us, in every reasonable extent, to respect that public opinion.

How long could an organized popular agitation in England against France, or in France against England, continue without actual hostilities, especially if embracing a majority of the people and the governments? Wars have as often been produced by popular passions as by the policy of rulers; but I venture to say that in the causes of all such wars during a century past, there has not been so much material for offence as could be found every year in the fulminations of a party swaying the governments of many northern states against the entire social and industrial systems of fifteen of our sister states;—so much to repel the opinion, to alienate the sentiments, and to wound the pride.

MODERATE REPUBLICANS.

It would be doing injustice to multitudes of patriotic citizens who belong to the Republican party to impute to them extreme opinions or intentions consciously hostile to the peace and safety of the southern states. Antagonism to the democratic party, habitual with many who were whigs; misapprehensions and excitement growing out of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the Kansas controversy; opposition to various incidents in the policy of the existing democratic Administration; the desire for change and for new combinations which arises under a continuous ascendancy of any party in our country,—all these motives of political action have arrayed in the Republican ranks many men of moderate opinions, who, if they saw the real nature and inevitable results of a sectional party organization, would recoil from them in just and patriotic alarm.

FALSE POSITION OF THEIR PARTY.

It is not the purposes of such men, but the practical attitude of their party, which constitutes the evil. That party is in a false position. Without the counterpoise which would be the effect of its affiliation with the opposition element in the southern states, freed from any such necessity for moderation, com-

peting for popular favor in the North alone, and, therefore, addressing itself exclusively to northern opinions, prejudices and passions, it has been steadily drifting into a more vehement, a less discriminating and a blinder antagonism to the South, and yielding to the dominion of extreme ideas and of the more violent elements which it contains. Without any thing to represent it in the southern states, it has no means to resist the inevitable tendency there to impute to it purposes even beyond those which it really entertains; and no means of inspiring confidence, allaying apprehension, or conciliating opinion among the masses in the localities of the South.

THE NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES.

It is thus that the divergence between these majorities of the North on the one side, and the whole people of the South on the other, has been for years increasing. Extremes on the one side provoke extremes on the other. Alienation, mutual distrust, misapprehension of each other's motives and objects, animosities, and, above all and worse than all, convictions and principles which induce each to dictate impracticable conditions of reconciliation, are setting deeper and deeper into the masses under the influence of systematic sectional agitation.

It would be strange if this immense and powerful popular machinery swaying the state governments of both sections, which has been employed for five years in dividing the country geographically, had not cloven down between the masses of the people in the two sections a chasm deeper and wider and more difficult to close up than ever existed before.

CHRONIC SECTIONALISM IS INEVITABLE DISUNION.

If such a division of parties, founded upon such antagonism of opinions, habits, and interests involving the systems of industry and of society, existing at the North and in the South, becomes chronic, its natural and inevitable result must be disunion. The cord of fraternal sentiment and common opinion which holds the sections together, cannot, by any possibility, endure the gradual, steady wear of these unceasing conflicts, and the ever-augmenting violence of the shock of repeated collisions between the popular masses which the two sections embody.

This is, to me, no new opinion. I communicated it in writing in 1855, to a gentleman now eminent in the Republican party, before he engaged in its formation; and expressed the conviction that the evil would have reached a dangerous, if not fatal point of culmination when a purely northern party should have found itself able to elect a President on a pitched battle with the southern states over questions and ideas which thrill to the very life-centres of southern society.

SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION THUS FAR.

I have now considered the anomalous nature of the Republican party as an organization; I have shown how, as it assumes the powers of our federative sys-

tem, it subverts the essential character of that system, and erects in practice a foreign government over fifteen states. I have pointed out how, in the mean time, such a division of parties is educating the people for disunion; in what manner it ripens its fatal fruits, and to what maturity they have already approached. I have indicated the subject of the controversy between the northern majorities and the southern people, out of which this condition of things arises; demonstrated how near it is to the very structure of civil, social, and industrial life in all the South; and inferred that it is only such a subject of controversy that could create such a state of parties; and conversely, that such a state of parties, on such a subject, is a concentrated evil and an accumulated danger. I have invoked the maxims deduced from the experience of all mankind, and our own accepted theories of self-government to justifying me in stating the immense presumption, that the southern people understand the effects upon themselves of the Republican organization and policy better than the Republicans do; and that, at all events, the nearly unanimous judgment of fifteen great communities ought to be respected; that their judgment, as to the establishment over them of any affirmative measures exclusively affecting themselves, ought to be conclusive.

It remains to analyze the avowed proposition of the Republican party to the people of the South.

Are the southern people to be convinced, or is the Republican party to recede from its principles, its policy, and its organization? In what manner is a reconciliation to be effected, and upon what terms? What ought to be the basis of a reconciliation? Will the Republican party make it voluntarily, or must the people of the North cast off the Republican party as an element of disease and discord, and thus restore harmony and health to our federative system?

If the Republican party entrenches itself in the Presidency, will the constitution of our body politic await the tardy remedy, or will it perish in the process towards restoration?

These are grave questions. Let us proceed to consider them.

CHARACTER, AIMS, AND POLICY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.

What is the character of the Republican party? What are the aims? What is to be its practical policy, in case it gains possession of the government?

ORGANIZED AGITATION AGAINST SLAVERY.

1. It is an organized agitation on the general question of slavery, mainly irrespective of the practical application of its conclusions to any proposed measure of legislation or administration by the federal government. It is not easy to define the exact limit where the liberty of philosophical speculation or abstract discussion ends, and an offence against good neighborhood — whether of individuals, families, or states — begins. But it is very clear that the Repub-

lican party has passed that boundary; for an organized agitation by a majority of one community, including its government, against the social or industrial system of a neighboring and friendly community is an offence which leads to alienation and hostility, if not to actual war. Even if we assume that the exclusion of slavery from the territories is within the legitimate sphere of the federal government, it cannot be pretended that the general character of the discussion kept up by the Republican party is subordinate to that end. Indeed, the territorial aspect of the controversy has almost entirely disappeared. Instead of inquiring how far it is the right and the duty of the northern states through the federal government to give effect on the territorial question to the general ideas they might be assumed to entertain, the orators and journals, which represent the Republican party are almost exclusively occupied in exciting the hostility of the people against slavery as a system, irrespective of the territories, and often the intention is avowed to act by indirect means upon slavery within the states.

"MORAL SUASION" THROUGH OUR FEDERATIVE GOVERNMENT.

Among those means is a gigantic system of "moral suasion," as Mr. Seward calls it in one of his recent speeches, *moral coercion* in fact, by which it shall propagate its ideas among the people of the southern states against their present social and industrial systems, through permanent party organizations dominating in the northern states, swaying the northern governments, and finally through the federative government of all the states. Mr. Seward does not say whether the postmasters and other officers of the federative government are to be made little centres of antislavery opinion; but he seems to think that all the usual methods by which parties act may be properly applied to the end. Now the states are as sovereign, with respect to slavery within their own borders as any foreign nation. If we were by "moral suasion" to attempt to apply our ideas in respect to the only rightful form of government, or in respect to the freedom of the press to the French people, through our minister at Paris, he would be dismissed, and if found to be acting under our instructions, we should become objects of just hostilities on the part of the French government. A similar experiment in the southern states would probably result in the expulsion of the federal officials, if not in a civil war. According to the principles of public law and in all moral aspects, such interference in the internal affairs of a state would be more inexcusable when she were united with us in a confederation, than if she were in all respects a foreign nation. And the difficulty of the case is, that even if the endeavor were fairly made to confine the agitation to the territorial question, it would be impossible so to confine it in practice, on the basis of opinion which characterizes the Republican party, and gives it all its vitality.

FALSE RULE OF LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

2. The rule of moral right and duty which, I think, may be fairly said to be generally adopted by the Republican party, is stated by Mr. Seward, in his speech at Lansing: "I will favor, as long as I can," said he, "within the limits of constitutional action, the decrease and diminution of African slavery in all the states."

THEORY OF THIS RULE.

The theory is, that slavery is a wrong, without reference to any condition of time, place, or circumstances; that the limit of our moral responsibility for the wrong is fixed exactly according to our legal and constitutional power to remove it; that it is, therefore, not only our right but our duty to exert whatever legal or constitutional power we possess for its removal.

This theory runs through all Mr. Seward's speeches; and is, I think, the master-key to the whole argument by which the Republican leaders address the popular mind.

ITS PRACTICE.

The practical application and necessary consequences of this theory, can be gleaned from the speeches of Mr. Seward.

INDIRECT ACTION ON SLAVERY WITHIN THE STATES.

In his recent speech at Dubuque, he states what it is *not* proposed to do, in this guarded manner: "We do not *vote* against slavery in Virginia. We do not authorize Abraham Lincoln or the Congress of the United States to *pass any laws* about slavery in Virginia." Observe how carefully his language is framed not to disclaim any of the forms of *indirect action* upon slavery within the states.

CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION BY EXCLUDING ONE AND ADMITTING THE OTHER CLASS OF STATES.

In his Rochester speech he thus indicates the constitutional mode of abolishing slavery within the states:

"It is true that they (the fathers) necessarily and wisely modified this policy of freedom, by leaving it to the several states, affected as they were by different circumstances, to abolish slavery in their own way and at their own pleasure instead of confiding that duty to Congress.

* * * * *

"But the very nature of these modifications fortifies my position that the fathers knew that *the two systems could not endure within the Union*, and expected that within a short period slavery would disappear forever. Moreover, in order that these modifications might not altogether defeat their grand design of a republic maintaining *universal equality*, they provided that *two-thirds of the states might amend the constitution*.

"It remains to say on this point only one word, to guard against misapprehension. If these states are to again become universally slaveholding, I do not

pretend to say with what violations of the constitution that end shall be accomplished. On the other hand, while I do confidently believe and hope that my country will yet become a land of universal freedom, I do not expect that it will be made so otherwise than through the action of the several states co-operating with the federal government, and all acting in strict conformity with their respective constitutions."

The mode provided by the constitution for its own amendment, is not accurately stated by Mr. Seward in the above extract, but the plan of applying it so as to abolish slavery within the states is sufficiently disclosed. In a recent speech, he proposes to absolutely exclude from admission into the Union all new states having slaves, and to apply our northern system to all new states; evidently looking to the multiplication of the free states until their number shall enable them to alter the constitution and "the grand design of a republic maintaining universal equality" shall be consummated, without the consent and in defiance of the will of the southern states.

REORGANIZING THE SUPREME COURT.

In a speech in the Senate he proposed to reorganize the Supreme Court of the United States for the purpose of reversing the decision upon the relative rights of the states and their citizens on the question of slavery.

DISBANDING THE ARMY AND NAVY.

And at Lansing he declared that it was his "duty as a patriot" to go for having "no army and navy" of the Union, because their "whole object" was "that slaves may not escape from the slave states into the free, and that freed or emancipated negroes in the free states may not enter and introduce civil war into the slave states, and because that, if we provoke a foreign enemy, the southern frontier is exposed to invasion from England, France, and Spain." The constitution not only contains an express covenant for the protection of each of the states against "domestic violence" and foreign "invasion," but in its preamble declares that to "ensure domestic tranquillity" and "provide for the common defence" were among the very objects for which it was instituted. And yet Mr. Seward avows the startling doctrine, that for the very reason that the army and navy are used to carry out these objects in respect to the southern states they ought to be disbanded.

BIDDING REVOLUTION "GOOD SPEED."

In his recent speech at Madison, he declares that "it is by a simple rule that he has studied the constitution," which rule is that "no human being," "no race," should be "kept down in their efforts to rise to a higher state of liberty and happiness;" but that if any such "would rise, I say to them, in God's name, good speed."

THE PRACTICAL RESULT.

The result he stated in a speech at an early day: "It (slavery) can and must be abolished, and you and I must do it."

OBJECT OF TEACHING THE DOCTRINE OF THE "IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT."

And in order to incite the northern mind to a crusade against slavery in the states, as well as the territories, to blind the eye of the North and still its conscience to the aggressive character of the movement against the social and industrial systems of our sister states, violating alike the express compacts of the constitution and the principles of public law which define the relations of independent sovereignties, he adopts the fallacious theory invented by Mr. Lincoln, of the "irrepressible conflict." He teaches not as a doctrine of abstract philosophy, but a practical necessity, that the northern states cannot preserve their own social and industrial systems without overthrowing those of the southern states; that "the rye fields and wheat fields of Massachusetts and New York must be surrendered by their farmers to slave culture and to the production of slaves, and Boston and New York become once more markets for trade in the bodies and souls of men," or, "the cotton and rice fields of South Carolina and the sugar plantations of Louisiana" be "tilled by free labor." Having thus invested the crusade with all the sanctions of the sacred necessity of self-defence, he leads it forward, by the methods and means which I have exhibited, through artful evasions of the forms of the constitution to violate the substance of its obligations.

PREVALENCE OF IMPRACTICABLE IDEAS.

I certainly do not impute to every member of the Republican party such sentiments. On the contrary, there are large numbers of patriotic citizens attached to that party wholly incapable of adopting theories so wild, so fanatical, so revolutionary; and I admit, that even the mass of those who assent to them do not see their true character, or the inevitable disasters of attempting to reduce them to practice.

But I cannot fail to see, in the mind of every second man I meet among the Republicans, the prevalence of ideas upon which it is impracticable to administer a confederated government. I lament it as a consequence of a division of parties, in which the northern people know neither the subject of the controversy nor its true bearing, nor their antagonists, except through their imaginations.

MR. SEWARD'S RELATION TO THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.

Mr. Seward represents the greatest state of the Union in the Senate; is of mature age and experience; and has more partisans and more practical power over the Republican mind and the Republican organization than any other one of its members. He is its representative man. He has recently traversed the northern states, with social revolution dropping from his lips at every step, amid the acclamations of the masses of the Republican party. And yet men are found who ascribe to the prejudices of the South, or to misrepresentations of the aims of the Republican party, the complete alienation and repulsion of the unanimous public opinion of the southern people, which undeniably exists.

ORIGIN OF THESE FALSE SYSTEMS.

The origin of all this evil is in the rule of conduct to which I have adverted, as generally adopted by the Republicans, and indeed to a considerable extent accepted by the northern mind.

RULE FOR CONSTRUING AND EXECUTING THE CONSTITUTION.

As a rule of right and duty for the construction and execution of the constitution, the theory maintained by Mr. Seward, and too extensively accepted, is entirely fallacious. No contract governing complicated transactions or relations between men, and applying permanently through the changes inevitable in human affairs, can be effectual if either party intended to be bound by it is at liberty to construe or execute its provisions in a spirit of hostility to the substantial objects of these provisions. Especially is this true of a compact of confederation between the states, where there can be no common arbiter invested with authorities and powers equally capable with those which courts possess between individuals for determining and enforcing a just construction and execution of the instrument. Mr. Seward sees, the public mind of the South sees more clearly, that an institution of the peculiar nature of slavery cannot long exist within the states if the powers of the federative government are to be swayed in active hostility to it, even though no violation of the express letter of the constitution be perpetrated; even though the hostile action be confined to a systematic use of the powers of the government for the purposes of its destruction, and to a systematic abdication of the powers of protection when they incidentally affect slavery in operating upon the communities in which it exists.

CRITERION OF MORAL RIGHT AND DUTY.

The rule to which I have adverted is equally fallacious as a criterion of moral right and duty. No man has the right or duty to impose his own convictions upon others, or to govern his own conduct in his relations with others, by his exclusive opinion or will. His right and duty in such cases are not absolute, but qualified. In practice, no man can get along in his relations with others, even with those who are most subject to him, if he exercise his full legal or constitutional powers absolutely according to his individual opinion or will. No husband can live with his wife, no father with his children, no partner with his associates, on such terms.

DUTY OF SELF-RESTRAINT.

Now the idea I wish to inculcate is, that there is no moral wrong in our accepting the self-restraint upon the exercise of even our undoubted legal and constitutional powers which the experience of mankind has shown to be wise.

It is upon the same idea, applied to our physical powers, that the public law of the world, which forbids the intervention of one state in the purely internal affairs of another, is built up.

IDEA OF SELF-RESTRAINT THE BASIS OF OUR FEDERATIVE SYSTEM.

When our fathers entered upon the work of forming the Union, they found the states existing as independent sovereignties. They might have constructed a system which would have been imperial in its character, subjecting all the internal affairs of the states to the dominion of a centralized government. Or they might have made the mixed system which they established imperial in respect to the subject of slavery within the states. Or, if failing to obtain the consent of any state to such a system, they might have excluded that state from the Union.

NOT WRONG, BUT WISE AND RIGHT.

Did they commit a moral wrong in choosing to leave the whole subject of slavery within each state to its separate judgment? I think that they did not. The decision which they made accorded with the whole theory on which they constructed the government. It was wise in itself. It was right. If the wisdom collected from the experience of the world in regard to government is to be relied on, the distribution of powers they adopted was the best, the depository of the trust of working out the problem of the superior and subject races within the states, if not perfect, was the safest which the nature of the case admitted. It is binding upon us not merely by the force of compact, not merely by a great principle of public law, but by its intrinsic wisdom and righteousness.

OBJECTION ANSWERED.

It is no answer to this reasoning to say that the dominant race in a state where slavery exists is upon this question an interested party as well as the judge. Such is the position of the governing power in every human society; and yet so wonderful are the laws of mutual action and influence between the parts of the social mechanism that it has generally been able to work out the welfare of all better than foreign government, and better than propagandism of any system by foreign force. The selfishness of the one, modified by so many restraints, is rarely so dangerous as the inexpert ignorance and impracticable experiments of the others. I cannot think it a misfortune that, according to the system of our fathers, no appeal lies from the white man of the states where slavery exists to the white man of the other states. It is not a moral wrong to construe and execute the provisions of the constitution affecting this question, and even to extend and apply them to incidental questions not foreseen at its formation, in accordance with the plan, and in the spirit of comprehensive wisdom in which that instrument was conceived.

THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION.

3. I come now to the position of the Republican party on the territorial question. I understand that position to be, that it is the right and duty of the people, through the federative government, to effectually prevent the extension of slavery beyond the

geographical area in which it now exists within the present states.

The Chicago platform applies the doctrine that all men are entitled to liberty, to the black race, without any qualification of place, time, or circumstances; and applies the principle of restriction to all the territories. Mr. Seward has lately restated the position of the Republican party, in these words: "Our responsibilities are limited to the states yet to come into the Union, and we will apply our system to them."

Mr. Lincoln's speeches are full of denunciations of "the further spread of slavery," the restriction of which will, he predicts, "place it where the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction." "We know," says he, "the opening of new countries tends to the perpetuation of the institution, and so does keep men in slavery who would otherwise be free." "Nothing," he again says, "will make you successful, but setting up a policy which shall treat the thing as wrong." . . . "This government is expressly charged with the duty of providing for the general welfare. We believe that the spreading out and perpetuity of the institution of slavery impairs the general welfare." . . .

"To repress this thing, we think, is providing for the general welfare."

THEORY ON WHICH ABSOLUTE RESTRICTION IS FOUNDED.

The philosophical idea on which the policy of restriction rests is, that if the system of slavery be absolutely confined to a fixed geographical area, the emigration of the white race who wish to retain the system, and of the black race held under it, will be restrained; that both races will go on increasing by births; that the population within that area becoming more and more dense, the cost of subsisting the slave will press with constantly augmenting force upon the value of his labor, until the master ceases to derive any surplus, and voluntarily emancipates the slave.

This idea is sometimes expressed in the affirmative sense of extinguishing slavery; and sometimes in the negative sense of refusing to perpetuate it; but the means and the results are identical in both cases.

OBJECT OF THE POLICY AND MODE OF ITS EN- FORCEMENT.

The policy of restriction aims to control, directly and immediately, the distribution between the occupied and unoccupied portions of the continent belonging to us, of the eight and a half millions of whites and four millions of blacks now coexisting in the fifteen southern states and of all their descendants, so long as the present relation between the two races shall continue. It aims indirectly and eventually to subvert the relation which now exists between the two races. The Republican party proposes to establish this policy by a combination of majorities of the people of the northern states, acting through the federal government, against the unanimous opposition of the

whole people of the fifteen southern states. The judgment of the northern states, pure and simple, adversely to the judgment of the southern states, is to take upon itself, and prescribe and enforce its own solution of this great problem of races, their distribution and relations, which reaches to the very social life-centres of fifteen southern states.

A MERE ABSTRACTION AT PRESENT.

It is true that, at present, so far as the territories are concerned, the policy is a mere theory. There is no territory whose destiny is practically in dispute. The area within the fifteen southern states is more than the growth and expansion of the social and industrial systems of the south can at present occupy.

Might not the North rest in the hope that the next generation, when it should have occasion to act practically, would do so with larger experience and greater wisdom? Might it not wait and see? Is it necessary for us to seize the powers of the government to establish and enforce any policy so far in advance — especially, by the dangerous machinery of a purely northern party creating in practice a purely northern government — more especially at the hazard of scattering in ruins the glorious fabric of civil liberty reared by our fathers?

THE THEORY ANALYZED.

But let us confront this theory as a permanent and final policy. Let us analyze it, and see what would be its future value, and whether it can ever become established.

NATURAL AND MATERIAL LAWS.

Before entering on that discussion, I pause to trace the natural and material laws which are working out the distribution of races on our own portion of this continent, and shaping the social and industrial systems of the new states.

Whoever, will study the course of emigration from the old states to the unsettled lands of the West, will find that in the main it follows the adaptations of the new region to the industrial, domestic, and social habits of those who seek to better their condition by the use of cheaper and richer soils. The current of northern emigration does not deviate largely from certain parallels of latitude. The current of southern emigration, tending in the same general direction, spreads out, perhaps deflects, to the southwest. The volume of the northern current is from twice to three times as large as that of the southern current; and, therefore, tends to press southwardly the line where the two touch each other. Geographical causes favor this result. As you reach the eastern border of Texas, the Gulf shore turns towards the South. As you pass Missouri, you begin to ascend to the more austere climates of the great slope of the Rocky Mountains.

Material causes intervene to turn a portion of the southern emigration to the southwest and also to separate the element of slavery and to carry that to the southwest.

SLAVERY WITHDRAWS FROM THE TRACK OF NORTHERN EMIGRATION.

The result is that slavery has no tendency to extend itself in or towards the track of northern settlers. On the contrary, it is withdrawing and moving towards the tropics. Obvious before, this law has been rendered more conspicuous and more potential to mature its fruits rapidly, by the remarkable events which have characterized the last ten or fifteen years.

MATERIAL CAUSES ACCELERATE.

The great and steady influx of gold, acting upon the circulating medium and the systems of credit, has, to an extraordinary degree, stimulated production and consumption throughout all Christendom. One effect is seen in the transcendent growth of the foreign trade of all the civilized nations. Another is in an improvement of the physical condition of the masses, and an enlargement of their command over the necessities, comforts, and even luxuries of life, greater, perhaps, than they have hitherto attained in any one century.

Cotton has been found to be the cheapest and most convenient material for human clothing; which, after food and shelter, is the first object of the enlarged means of expenditure by the masses. The spindle and the loom could be multiplied to keep pace with the augmenting demand; but negro hands to cultivate the cotton fields could not. They must wait the slow course of nature, or be diverted from other employments; and even both resources have been thus far insufficient. Through the war in the Crimea and the war in Italy, through the panic of 1854 and the revolution of 1857, cotton has, in the main, held the even tenor of its way, in a range of high prices; while iron, coal, lumber, sugar, and breadstuffs have undergone extreme and violent fluctuations. Cotton has been unceasingly out-bidding other employments for negro hands. It has within ten years doubled, probably more than doubled, the market value of all such labor. A man who to-day employs slaves in raising wheat or corn on the southern bank of the Ohio, uses labor at least twice as costly as it was ten years ago. His neighbor on the northern bank finds the moderate advance in free labor resulting from the increase in general prices, compensated by improved machinery; and can produce wheat as cheaply as ten years ago.

Cotton is struggling hard to translate the black race held in slavery to the seats of its own and kindred cultures. Family and social habits, an honorable sentiment against selling dependants towards whom the worth and piety of the South consider themselves as trustees, resists; but the changes of life are inevitable; and the social laws at last prevail, as the unceasing current of a stream outlasts the strokes of the swimmer. I see every day testimonies of the actual working of these tendencies. I read, not long ago, in the *Evening Post*, an extract from the *St. Louis Democrat*, stating that one hundred slaves daily

left St. Louis for the South. That statement may have been inaccurate as a matter of detail; but the general fact cannot be questioned.

RESTRICTION IN THE TRACK OF SOUTHERN EMIGRATION.

If, then, slavery has no capacity to extend itself, in any practical degree, into or towards the track of northern emigration; let us now inquire what would be the results of the restrictive policy applied to the track of southern emigration.

This, I have already observed, is, at present — perhaps for all our generation — a purely theoretical question. But let us imagine that it were now a practical question. Let us suppose that all the eight and a half millions of whites and four millions of blacks composing the population of the fifteen southern states were concentrated in the region east of the boundary between Alabama and Mississippi.

I do not now decide whether the degree of density required for the perfection of the experiment would even then have been attained; and, in the progress towards that density, doubtless the whites not holding slaves would have been, to a large extent, expelled. But assume the conditions to be such that the cost of subsisting the slave would approach the value of his labor. I would like to have our philosophers and philanthropists who advise the experiment solve some difficulties which we must anticipate.

IMPRACTICABLE OR UNNECESSARY.

1. What is there in human history to warrant the idea that a people, not having yet consented to self-destruction, could be confined on one side of an imaginary line, with their physical condition steadily approximating to the want and misery which attend excessive density of population, when on the other side of that imaginary line, unoccupied and fertile lands invite them to abundance and prosperity? What degree of power in the government would be required to enforce a law imposing such a policy upon even a feeble community? What degree of coercion would be required against eight and a half millions of our race? three times as many as achieved our revolution? Against how many and in what proportions of the two races such coercion would have to be exerted when all the present territory should be filled up with population to the requisite degree of density, it is impossible to predict; but it is perfectly safe to say that the policy proposed by the Republican party to be theoretically adopted as a finality, at vast hazard of general ruin, a generation in advance of the time when it could take full practical effect, would, as soon as that time should arrive, prove wholly impracticable without the consent of the people to whom it would be applied: as with that consent it would be wholly unnecessary.

Is it expected that the people to whom the system is to be applied will be blind and deaf until it shall have approached such fatal results? Is it not inevitable that they will be as prompt to resist and repel as you will be to organize and inflict your system?

FALSE PHILANTHROPY.

2. Does not the nature of the process imply a constantly progressive deterioration in the physical condition of the slave? Will not the master be forced by the necessity of self-preservation into a struggle to over-work and under-feed the slave, until, failing to make the products of labor meet the cost of subsisting the laborer, he succumbs: and the social and industrial systems topple in common ruin? Has not philanthropy run mad when it purposes to work out the liberation of the slave by such a process? Does it not arrogate to itself the infallibility of Divine wisdom, when out of humanity to the slave, it would, by force of law, starve him into freedom?

Does it not arrogate to itself the power of the Almighty, when it attempts to establish such a system over fifteen communities with complete governments, with a population of twelve and a half millions, and occupying a region larger than half of Europe, by external legislation enforced by external power? If no government known to history has ever been strong enough to do this thing, what terms can adequately characterize the wild hallucination of attempting it through the limited powers and under the self-checking forms of confederation?

3. As the policy operates to restrain the emigration of the owner and the slave, but not the white man who holds no slaves, must not the effect be to cause the latter to emigrate? Must not the proportion of the black race to the white be incessantly increasing by the operation of a permanent cause? At last, when the system culminates in emancipation, must not the result be communities almost exclusively of blacks? Can the whites live in such communities? Should we not, in the ultimate effects of the restrictive policy, convert our sister states into negro governments? Will we then allow them equality in our Union, as our Republican friends propose at the coming election to allow the blacks of this state equality in the elective franchise? Would it not, on the whole, be better to let the black man go towards the tropics as best he may, bond or free, so that, if at last we come to dissolve our Union, the dissolution may be only with the black republics of the tropics; and we may at least retain the original thirteen who fought the battle of our independence, and the riparian states that control the navigation of the Mississippi, with white men for the governing power?

4. Have we sufficiently considered whether acting upon slavery in the territories, in order to react upon it within the states, even if it were within our literal authority, would not be in some sort a fraud on the distribution of powers provided by the constitution? May a man get the Street Commissioner to wall up the entrance to my house on the pretext that it is only exercising the rights of the public over the streets which belong to the public? May my neighbor flood my farm because the dam which creates the overflow is built upon his own land? May a man plant his foot firmly on the safety-valve and silence the engineer by

saying that he does not interfere with the boiler? Now is not the natural increase by which one hundred and twenty thousand are every year added to the slave population as much a necessity as the existence of the present four millions? Is not another four millions of blacks within the next twenty-five years just as much a fact as the present four millions? Can any man stop it? Is not the fact which is to come an inevitable incident to the fact which now exists? Must it not be dealt with as a part of the one great fact? To ignore this inevitable incident, is it not shallow in philosophy, inadequate in policy, disastrous failure in government? And to whom naturally belongs the solution of the problem it creates, except to those communities who have the great trust of the principal fact and whom we do not propose even to consult? Ought we to refuse even to join with ourselves in determining such a question, those who must reap the good or bear the ill of our decision in a case which, so far as the track of southern emigration is concerned, cannot affect us in the least? Should we attempt to establish over them a policy—even if we sincerely think it best for them—which nobody among them can be found to approve or uphold?

5. Would not a wise man, with a conscientious sense of responsibility, although theoretically opposed to slavery, if he were to be invested with absolute power over the primary fact of slavery within the states, or of the incidental fact of its natural growth, find himself unable, just in proportion as he should study these facts, to deal with them on any artificial system of human devising? Well might Mr. Seward say that John Quincy Adams died despairing of a peaceful solution of the question; for he had not, as Mr. Seward has not, any of that master-philosophy for such a problem, which says to the federal government, **LET IT ALONE.**

6. If in the attempt to solve this problem according to our own ideas, and to enforce our solution through the federative government, adversely to the whole public opinion of the southern states, we should break up the constitutional compact between us, should we not fail of establishing our policy with its imaginary benefits, while we should become the authors of the most transcendent calamity any generation has ever been able to inflict upon mankind?

POLICY OF THE FATHERS.

The traditional policy of our government, established by the fathers, and followed until 1850, is to be studied in all the acts of Congress upon the subject of slavery considered collectively.

It was:—

1st. To prohibit slavery by federal legislation, at the instance of the North, and with the consent of the South, in the territories lying substantially within the track of northern emigration.

2d. To leave the territories lying in the track of southern emigration without any federal legislation prohibiting slavery.

The ordinance of 1787, applying the restriction to all territories north of the Ohio, and the Missouri Compromise of 1820, applying it to all territories north of the southern line of Missouri, were the parent measures, to which all the other acts were subordinate. None of the other acts of restriction extended their operation south of the lines established by those measures.

At the adoption of the constitution the southern states consisted of a scattering population upon the eastern slopes of the Alleghanies. All the people in the region now embraced in states lying west of the ridge did not much exceed the number of persons to-day congregated in a single ward of the city of New York.

Emigration has pushed westward until almost two-thirds of the present population of the South is in a region which seventy years ago was a wilderness. On the west of Virginia has sprung up Kentucky; on the west of North Carolina, Tennessee; on the west of Georgia and South Carolina, Alabama, and afterwards Mississippi,—all formed out of the original domain of the United States.

An entire tier of states on the west bank of the Mississippi, comprising Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri, have been added out of Mr. Jefferson's Louisiana purchase. This tier embraces the whole track of the southern emigration, extending to the North even beyond that track. It carries the divisional line in the west, which had been deflected to the south by the adoption of the diagonal course of the line which has become the boundary between the free and the slave systems in the original states, by the voluntary action of those states. Florida on the south, and Texas on the south-west, have been subsequently added.

Now, in all this region, embracing the entire track of the southern emigration, there has been no legislation of the federative government interfering with the natural course of southern emigration, or disturbing the action of the physical laws by which it is governed, or preventing the establishment by the new communities thus formed of industrial and social systems, similar to those of the states from which the emigration proceeded.

THEIR SELF-RESTRAINT VOLUNTARY.

I know the idea is inculcated that the government has abstained from such legislation only from defect of power or in submission to actual compact.

To this I answer, *first*, that if this allegation were true, it would show that the policy of universal restriction of slavery, which has been ascribed to the fathers, was, at best, but a theory, never reduced to practice; nor of much weight as indicating the matured judgment as to practical legislation of statesmen who were never called on to put a speculative opinion into operation, or of the people who were never called on to submit to its effects; *secondly*, that there is no foundation whatever for

the allegation that the fathers would have applied the restrictive system to the track of southern emigration, if they could; or that they omitted to do so from any such necessity as is pretended, or from any reason other than their ideas of the self-restraint which a wise policy imposes on practical statesmen dealing with such a question. They had every means, method, and power open to their use which have been proposed to be employed for that purpose in our modern times. I say this advisedly; and, though I cannot now stop to discuss details, I hold myself ready to maintain the statement.

Washington, Jefferson, and Madison, all Virginians, were undoubtedly opposed in theory to slavery, and looked forward to its ultimate extinction; but they were practical statesmen, and they did not make any serious endeavors to surmount the intrinsic difficulties of the subject, either in Virginia or Kentucky, where it was open to their legal and constitutional action, still less in southern territories through the federative government. They probably were never able to see clearly any satisfactory method and means of giving effect to their desires, even in the infancy of the institution; and they wisely left it to itself until the people interested should feel themselves able to solve the problem. No men had more power to have changed the practical policy and practical results which I have shown to be facts of our history. That policy grew up and matured its fruits during the period of their administrations, and of their unapproachable influence over the public mind of this country, without opposition or dissent from them, often with their concurrence. Jefferson and Madison survived the time of the Missouri controversy; were then in retirement, free from all bias of political aspiration, sedulous only for the welfare and happiness of their country; and certainly not wanting in philanthropy towards any of the human race. They have both left on record their earnest, thoughtful, warning protest against the whole scheme of applying through federal legislation the restrictive system to southern territory, contrary to the will of the existing southern states. That a party organization exclusively northern, dominating in the federal government, should enforce such a system was never within their contemplation. That fact, if it shall be to-day inevitable, will be the political calamity of a later generation.

MODE AND TERMS OF ADJUSTING THE CONTROVERSY.

I assert that a controversy between powerful communities organized into governments, of a nature like that which now divides the North and South, can be settled only by convention or by war. I affirm this upon the universal principles of human nature, and the collective experience of all mankind. I aver it, in defiance of the babbling speech-makers who set up for statesmen without possessing or understanding one element of that character;

who pretend to superiority of principle, because they denounce compromise, which is, in the very nature of things, the only solution possible of such a difference between such parties.

By convention, I mean, not an ancient compact of confederation, but a fresh, living, practical assent of the wills of the parties to conditions in which those wills are moderately and fairly represented, so that the acquiescence of both parties may be secured.

INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES.

We must study the practical interests of both parties in the questions, in order to see what conditions will be adequate. The elements of the case are simple.

The northern states have a direct and important interest in keeping the natural course of their emigration into the territories substantially undisturbed, with freedom to such of their people as overflow into the territories to establish in their new seats such systems of industry and society as they have been accustomed to at home.

The southern states have exactly the same interest. Both have an indirect interest in the formation of new states, as it affects the balance of power between the two classes in the confederation.

Now in respect to the first interest, so long as the federal government refrains from interference, there is really no conflict except in imagination. For as long a future as the human vision can clearly scan, both have room enough, and they do not desire to occupy the same space. Slavery not only refuses to go into or towards the track of the northern settlers in the territories, but withdraws faster than white labor can replace it in the territories and contiguous parts of adjacent states.

At an early period southern settlers touched the parts of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, which encroached upon their track, sooner than northern settlers reached any portion of those states; and a feeble disposition to carry slavery there was manifested, but it was ineffectual.

The only other tendency to conflict arose on the border of Kansas, contiguous to Missouri. The divisional line established by the admission of Missouri with slavery, and the restriction of slavery from the territories west of it down to its southernmost boundary, became at this point perpendicular to the natural line of division between the two westward streams of emigration. It would not have been strange, therefore, if some settlers had crossed the boundary between the two with slavery; but it could gain no stable footing there; for the tendency for it to move down southward from Missouri was stronger than for it to ascend westward into Kansas. And a vast emigration from the northern hives was swarming towards both.

It is my well-considered conviction that not one state is now free from slavery, which would have

accepted it if no restriction by federal legislation had ever been enacted.

FORMS OF COMPROMISE.

Compromise of the territorial question has two forms. The one is by a divisional line practically agreed upon by the two sections, and declared by act of Congress. The other is worked out by natural and material causes, and finally declared by each locality when it is admitted as a state.

As an original question, I think the latter mode the best; for it avoids the struggle in fixing the line by the federative government; and it will more exactly respect the natural courses of emigration.

As to the interest of the two parties in the balance of power in the confederated government, the North certainly has nothing to fear. It gains in population at least seven hundred thousand as often as the South gains three hundred thousand, and it can form new states more rapidly. It has the advantage of greater numbers. The South, when attacked, has the advantage of greater unity.

UNION OR DISUNION.

Can the North understand the full import of the federative idea? Can it apply that idea completely to all the relations of the slavery question?

That is the problem of the continued existence of our Union in a government of confederated states. Majorities in all the northern states against all the South are not without extreme difficulty formed or combined, and being wholly unnatural, cannot last long enough to dictate or to fashion a permanent policy for the Union.

Such a result could never be reached except amid an extraordinary concurrence of circumstances, and in an entire failure of the northern people to see that the conflict is any thing more to the southern people than it appears to be in the North, — an ordinary struggle of political parties. This state of parties is only a paroxysm. Yet the North may, in a paroxysm, alarm and repel the South out of the Union.

LOGICAL RESULT AFTER DISUNION.

If it should do so, and if we should yet escape or recover from civil war, would we not soon wish to establish treaties of peace, — of free trade between them and us, — of unobstructed intercourse between our citizens? Might we not even desire an alliance for common defence? Is it not clear that such arrangements would be eminently wise and eminently conducive to the prosperity and welfare of both parties? would not such an arrangement be a salutary extension and improvement of the system which modern civilization is applying by diplomacy between independent nations all over the world?

If these results were once successfully accomplished, we should have restored an imperfect approach, poor and miserable indeed, — far worse than the old confederation, — to what our great forefathers intended in our federative government, which they

framed and which we shall have broken into pieces; in that case should we have any idea that it would be either our moral right or duty to interfere, in any manner, with slavery within their borders, or to suppress, by force, the natural growth of new communities like their own by the inevitable increase of their population?

Is it necessary for us to travel through all this dreary cycle to reach a result which it is just as wise, just as necessary for us now to adopt? Through what human misery, what individual ruin, what public calamity, would we then have attained a compulsory, and no doubt contented, inaction as to slavery in all those aspects in which it now makes us fanatical.

I say contented inaction; for in that case we should see and feel, that it was no more our moral right or duty to interfere with slavery in a southern state or territory than in the Empire of Brazil. We should thus, over the ruins of our confederated government, have been brought to some sense of the true theory of local self-government under our federal constitution. Our misfortune would be that our wisdom had come too late.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION.

It is with reluctance that I mingle one word of a personal nature in this discussion. But I must answer my personal friends of the *Evening Post*, who have courteously invited this discussion, so far as to say that I never held any opinion which could justify either the policy or the organization of the Republican party. If I had done so, I should not hesitate to frankly renounce so grave an error. I admit consistency, so far as it indicates conscientious deliberation and prudence in adopting opinions or in conduct, to be a quality which inspires confidence. But I do not consider it so great a virtue as a fixed purpose to do right; and a single modification in a man's opinions on one of the questions which have occupied the public mind during the period of twenty-five years, ought not to shake an established character for consistency, especially if it be moderate, reasonable, and free from every taint of selfishness. But, in truth, I never adopted the doctrine of absolute and universal exclusion, by federal legislation, of slavery from all territories, and still less that of the exclusion of new slave states; or the philosophical theory on which the doctrines are founded.

Mr. Greeley, last fall, detailed and repeated his personal recollection of the anti-Texas meeting of '44 at the Tabernacle, in which, as he alleged, I joined with him. His obvious motive was to embitter against me the resentments of Republicans who once belonged to the school of radical democracy. A candidate, when under the actual circumstances, as was known to the gentleman at whose instance I was nominated, and all my friends, that an election would have been a calamity to me, I felt at liberty to treat this misstatement — misrecollection, as I am willing to believe it — as I treated all similar ones of the canvass, with silent indifference. In 1844 I was strongly

inclined to the theory in respect to the tendency of slavery to confine itself to its own natural track, which subsequent reflection has established in my mind, and which I have developed in this letter; and I neither said nor did any thing inconsistent with it. I thought then that the question ought to be decided, not on the ideas either of New England or of Mr. Calhoun, but on general considerations of national policy; that the acquisition of Texas was expedient, but ought to be conducted in a prudent and proper manner. The provincial ideas of New England were not more offended by that measure than by the acquisition of Louisiana. They did not so strongly threaten to dissolve the Union, as they did on the same grounds, when the act was accomplished which gave the Mississippi to us all, and to the North Iowa, Minnesota, and the territories stretching to the Pacific. I presume that those from whom I then differed, and who now impeach my consistency, will advise a civil war to keep Texas and her kindred states in the Union if they should now attempt to go out.

On the acquisition of California, the North universally claimed that its *status* should not be changed by the act of the federal government. That was then the leading idea of the radical democrats of this state, as expressed in their most authentic and authoritative declaration. In assenting to that abstract idea, beyond which I never individually went, I did so in a sense of equitable partition, under which we had justified our acceptance of Texas; and might accept Cuba, — an abstract idea, however, which it was soon seen could not afford a perfect solution of the whole question in all its future aspects and applications, and which at that time was practically satisfied by the admission of California. Since that time the increasing development of the tendency of slavery to withdraw from even a contiguity to the track of northern emigration, and the immense influx of population from abroad, ought to convince every reflecting mind that whatever legal theory is adopted, our old habit of federal restriction over our portion of the territories can be safely abandoned, while any theory which should interfere with the track of southern emigration cannot be safely or rightfully applied by the legislation of the federal government.

The division in the democratic party of this state in 1848 bears no analogy to the Republican organization of to-day. It would not have happened, except for what was deemed to be a violation of the right of representation in a national convention; and the division was the year after composed, while the slavery question was still unsettled. Wise or unwise, right or wrong, it was in substance a mere protest. It is known that my personal wish then was, that its form should not have gone beyond its true practical character. The scheme of a permanent northern party was not, so far as I know, entertained among the radical democrats, except in the mind of one man, with whom it was a mere undeveloped idea, soon abandoned, but resumed in 1855, when he led his followers into the Republican camp. The worst conse-

quence of the division in 1848 was, not like the division of the democratic party now, to bring in a sectional candidate of a sectional party, but merely to let in a national party, with Taylor and Fillmore at its head, under whom the slavery questions were all wisely compromised. On that adjustment I have ever stood. Willing to accept the modern policy of total federal non-action in place of the system of division by federal legislation, I nevertheless used all my influence, at whatever sacrifice of relations, to resist the raising of the question of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, because I thought a theoretical conformity to even a wise system dearly purchased by breaking the tradition of ancient pacification on such a question, and between such parties. At the same time, merely a private citizen myself, I appreciate the difficulty a public man has in acting against a general principle for the sake of merely prudential considerations, especially amid a conflict of sections and of parties. I foresaw on the formation of the Republican party, the evils and dangers which it would create, if it should succeed, as it could not have done without great adventitious aids, in combining an unbroken mass of northern majorities; and I communicated my opinion to former political associates who joined the new organization. It is known to many that my whole action since has been dictated by this conviction. I have gone through this explanation on an invitation from those who were once my political as well as personal friends, in order to demonstrate that I have every right to be heard by them, fairly and candidly, when I now state the limitations of our rights and duties.

Let me say also that it was natural that on the happening of the events which gave rise to these questions, the northern mind should at first apply to them — too loosely and broadly I admit — the ideas which it had been accustomed to apply to the subject of slavery at home; ideas which the progress of events and the maturing of opinion have shown must be greatly limited in their application in order to adapt them to the theory of our federative system.

Let me add, that in renouncing the habit of federal legislation as to slavery in which we all grew up, and advocating the idea of federal non-interference with the industrial system of the South, I but conform to that sound political philosophy which, upon all the great industrial questions of our times, has always guided not myself alone, but all radical democrats; and which the *Evening Post*, in all cases, with this single inconsistent, disastrous exception, even now applies and ably champions in conspicuous antagonism to the entire political theory and persistent practice of the party with which it is now, in my judgment, unnaturally, and therefore, I hope, but temporarily associated.

CONCLUSIONS.

My conclusions are:—

1. That the southern states will not, by any possibility, accept the avowed creed of the Republican

party as the permanent policy of the federative government as to slavery, either in the states or territories; and,

2. That upon this creed the Republican party will not establish any affiliations with considerable minorities in the southern states.

All the evidence is, that the non-slaveholders are, generally, at least, as hostile to the Republican creed as the slaveholders. All experience shows that an interest very far less extensive, important, and fundamental than that of the slaveholders in the South, usually unites the whole local community in its support, especially against outside interference. And in this case, besides, there is a powerful motive, common to all, to preserve the social supremacy of their race. The very attempt to organize, by outside instigation, a separate class of non-slaveholders against the general opinion of these communities, would be itself a new and intolerable irritation. The dream of a Republican party in the South is a mere illusion.

3. A condition of parties in which the federative government shall be carried on by a party having no affiliations in the southern states, is impossible to continue. Such a government would be out of all relation to those states. It would have neither the nerves of sensation, which convey intelligence to the intellect of the body politic, nor the ligaments and muscles which hold its parts together, and move them in harmony. It would be in substance the government of one people by another people. That system will not do with our race. The fifteen organized states to be subjected to it now occupy a region as large as France, Italy, the Austrian Empire, the German states, and the British Isles. In my judgment, such a condition of things could not become complete in all the departments of the government, before the antagonism of the minority would throw off the government, by secession from the Union.

4. Nothing short of the recession of the Republican party to the point of total and absolute non-action on the subject of slavery in the states and territories could enable it to reconcile to itself the people of the South. Even then it would have great and fixed antipathies to overcome; and men and parties act chiefly from habit.

5. Will the Republican party submit itself to this inevitable necessity to revolutionize its whole character? To attempt this change and not to perish as a dominant party is barely possible. Not to attempt and accomplish it, and yet to live as an ascendant power in our Union, is totally impossible. The Republican party must become as national in its structure as the whig party was, and submit to the necessary conditions of such nationality, in order to be capable of governing the country. It must travel through the entire cycle of retrogression, and demonstrate that its existence in its present form was a mistake. The national whig party, if it had not been disbanded, might much sooner and more easily have taken the government, and could have done every

thing which is possible for the Republican party to accomplish without dissolving the Union.

6. The election of Mr. Lincoln, if it should occur, will place the Executive head of the federal government in the false and unnatural position I have depicted; that is to say, place it out of all relation to the people of fifteen states.

To the eyes of these states it appears as the forerunner of a complete system of the same character in the federal government. It fills their people with alarm; it excites strong resentments.

It will be a small alleviation that the result will have come about in some degree by divisions in the democratic party; and by dexterous use of electoral forms, whereby the northern majorities will constitute little over one-third of the whole vote cast.

It will be a greater alleviation, if the House of Representatives should change adversely to the Republican party.

7. Our northern people look at this thing in the light of the ideas which prepossess their own minds. They overlook one fact which renders the position of the parties unequal, — the fact that slavery exists at the South and not at the North. They claim equality in the operation of their ideas with those of the other party, which is in many respects peculiarly and exclusively affected by their operation.

They ask, have we not a right to elect a President in a constitutional manner by our votes? You have, in obedience to the fundamental ideas of our confederation, no more moral right to do so on the basis of your present party organization than you have to do a thousand other things which the laws and constitution allow, but which reason, justice, public policy, and fraternal sympathy forbid.

The South gave us Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson, Polk, Taylor, and we voted for them all. We offer them Lincoln, and they say they cannot vote for him because his policy is fatal to what, to them, is a vital interest, while to us it is but an abstract idea. We answer that we know better than they; if they will not agree with us we will not compromise, we will have our own way!

8. A southern partisan presidency on such a controversy, in unison with the southern state governments, would be an evil, even if unavoidable; but it would merely offend the *ideas* of the North. A northern partisan presidency on such a controversy, in conflict with the southern state governments, is manifestly pregnant with perils which no past experience has witnessed, and which threaten the whole fabric of our Union with swift destruction.

9. If we are not wise enough to abstain from creating such a state of things, what right have we to suppose the South will accept it with patience? Seeing the transcendent nature of the interest, — they have not the restraint of a party among them holding the sentiments of the northern majority, — they think that they are wronged, — they feel put upon self-defence. Have we a right to assume that they will act with

what, from our point of view, would be a prudent moderation?

I fear that from the very election of Mr. Lincoln, if it should unfortunately happen, we should be embarked upon a frightful agitation in all the South, — general alarm and excitement, — state conventions to deliberate upon the continuance of the Union. I recoil from contemplating the but too probable consequences in which all this must end. I know that the most wise, prudent, conservative, and patriotic men of the most Union-loving states of the South are filled with consternation when they think of the great surge of popular excitement which they will be called on to breast.

10. What will Mr. Lincoln do? Can he be expected, as President, to understand the state of things in any other sense than that of his own partisan policy? Can he avoid the attempt to maintain the power of his party by the same means which will have acquired it? Can he emancipate himself from the dominion of the ideas, associations, and influences which will have accompanied him in his rise to power? Can he be expected to act in any new direction with sufficient breadth of view and firmness of purpose?

If he shall fail adequately to respond to these great exigencies, the inevitable result as it presents itself to my judgment has been already sufficiently indicated.

11. If he should act in a spirit of large patriotism, what will be his position and means?

The history of Jackson's administration throws some light upon the difficulties which, in a vastly aggravated form, he may have to encounter, and upon the methods of action by which, if at all, they must be overcome.

Jackson had to deal with a question comparatively unimportant, and far less purely sectional. As a southern man of great popularity and renown, he stood strong in the confidence of all the southern people whose votes had just contributed to raise him to power. He was the head of a strong Jacksonian party organization in every southern state. Clay, the head of the adverse tariff interest, was also a southern man, and at the same time the head of a great party in all those states. And yet, with all these immense advantages, Jackson, because the controversy was partly sectional, was compelled to exert all his power and to display all his courage in order, with the aid of Clay and Webster, to accomplish its adjustment, even upon a basis of compromise and concession, and he accomplished this result at last by fighting the battle through the public opinion of the disaffected section.

Lincoln, if he should, in a crisis far more difficult, stand in the place of Jackson, to confront a public disorder infinitely more extensive, deeply seated, and dangerous — as he should stretch his eye a thousand miles over the region of disaffection, would see not one adherent; not one leader of local opinion with whom he was in established relations of friendship, sympathy, or support; not one representative to speak in his name, with power to win the ear of the masses;

not one of six hundred newspapers devoted to politics, and half that number devoted to other discussions, which had not been preoccupying the minds of the people with distrust, hatred, or fear of him. Without any of the means by which combats of opinion are fought among a free people, himself an offence, an obstruction, instead of a power to save,—the whole strain, the whole shock of the crisis would be thrown upon the mere intrinsic strength of our federal government.

I cannot, for one, assent to the creation of such a state of things. I have a faith in our popular system which never before faltered, but I dare not precipitate it upon such a trial. It is not a fair experiment. In my judgment, those who think it free from the most imminent peril, display the courage of men who having eyes cannot see. An incredulity, even more serene and stubborn, in the minds of monarchs, ministers, and peoples, has often been broken by revolution or by war. Such a crisis as that in which Lincoln's election would place our country can only be prudently treated after fully comprehending it. History is full of illustrations of the inadequate policy which meets civil convulsions, step by step, with concessions, at every stage, insufficient and too late, because the authors of the policy could not anticipate events, and events would not wait.

Elect Lincoln, and we invite those perils which we cannot measure; we attempt in vain to conquer the submission of the South to an impracticable and intolerable policy; our only hope must be that as President he will abandon the creed, the principles, and pledges on which he will have been elected.

Defeat Lincoln, and all our great interests and hopes are, unquestionably, safe.

If thus, or in any mode, we escape the perils of which his election will be the signal, our noble ship of state will issue forth from the breakers now foaming around and ahead, and spring forward into the open sea in all the majesty of her strength and beauty.


But if the Providence which has hitherto guided and guarded our country shall at last abandon us to our foolish and wicked strifes, I behold a far different scene.

It is too late! It is too late! We are upon the breakers. Whose eye quails now? Whose cheek blanches? It is not mine, who felt a "provident fear," and have done all I could. Where is the excellent President of the Chamber of Commerce, whom they perched up in the fore-castle to assure us that a good lookout was kept for our safety? Where are the dozen "great stakes," as Mr. Webster used to call them, whom they planted closely around him to shut out from the sight of the crew the beacon erected by Washington? Where are the thoughtless, reckless seamen who taunted me with cowardice when I vainly strove to warn them? I hear only the wailing cry of selfish terror as I sit upon the straining timbers, and watch the rage of the sea. My mind is filled, my heart swells with the thought, that yon wave which towers before us will engulf more of human happiness and human hopes than have perished in any one catastrophe since the world began.

S. J. TILDEN.

NEW YORK, October 26, 1860.





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